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ABSTRACT
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ECONOMY
PLANE FOR THE INTERNET
SEPTEMBER 2015
XINMING CHEN
B.E., TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY
M.Sc., TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Tilman Wolf
The Internet has been very successful in supporting many network applications.
As the diversity of uses for the Internet has increased, many protocols and services
have been developed by the industry and the research community. However, many of
them failed to get deployed in the Internet. One challenge of deploying these novel
ideas in operational network is that the network providers need to be involved in the
process.
Many novel network protocols and services, like multicast and end-to-end QoS,
need the support from network providers. However, since network providers are typi-
cally driven by business reasons, if they can not get economic prot from supporting
new protocols and services, they will not deploy them. Therefore, we conclude that
the lack of explicit economic relationship in the current Internet hinders the inno-
vation of itself, and it is critical that a network architecture intrinsically considers
economic relationships.
vii
ChoiceNet is an NSF funded Future Internet Architecture (FIA) project that aims
to address these challenges. ChoiceNet proposes an \economy plane" of the Internet
to explicitly represent economic relationship within the architecture. This economy
plane enables entities in the network to dynamically set up ne-grained, short-term
economic contracts for network services. A marketplace can be established for ad-
vertising and selling services. The services can be simple path services ( pathlets )
between end-points, or more complex processing and storage services (e.g., transcod-
ing and caching).
ChoiceNet is a comprehensive project, and its architecture is designed by re-
searchers from several institutes. This work will not cover every aspect of it. Instead,
this work will focus on ve aspects of ChoiceNet: 1) service denition and protocol
design, 2) marketplace design, 3) use plane design, 4) path nding algorithm design,
and 5) access control for services. Service denition aims at a unied and extensi-
ble description of services, and the method to compose them. Marketplace design
discusses the protocols used to advertise and request services. The use plane design
describes how network providers and users will access the Marketplace while preserv-
ing the existing infrastructure and applications, it also discusses how to progressively
deploy ChoiceNet in the current Internet. The path nding algorithm design propos-
es ParetoBFS, an algorithm nding all the Pareto-optimal paths in a multi-criteria
network. The access control discusses how to prevent unauthorized usage of the ser-
vices, we present OrthCredential, an algorithm for high-performance access control
in ChoiceNet. To prove the feasibility of such an economy plane, this work presents
a Software Dened Networking (SDN) based implementation of ChoiceNet. The im-
plementation has been deployed and tested on GENI, a global test bed for network
architectures.
By designing and implementing ChoiceNet, this work tries to oer a network
architecture that users can select from several dierent network services rather than
viii
being limited to a single choice. By enabling greater choice, ChoiceNet can promote
competition among providers for price and quality. This competition will lead to lower
prices and higher quality services, which are benecial for consumers and eventually
help bring sustained innovation into the Internet.
ix
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Since its birth in the 1960s1, the Internet has evolved in many aspects. As the
diversity of uses for the Internet is increasing, demands for additional protocols and
services are emerging. Recently, there has been much interest in the networking
community to explore new network architectures of the future Internet [57]. Novel
protocols and applications are being proposed, and the Internet provides a foundation
for them by providing data communication functionality between end-systems.
However, while the technology for new network requirements is being developed,
there are challenges in deploying innovation in the Internet. A key problem in deploy-
ing innovative features in the network core is that many protocols and services need
support from providers throughout the network. In the early stage of the Internet,
innovations were made in the core by a small group of researchers and operators.
With todays dramatically larger community, consensus is more dicult to achieve
and innovation is for the most part limited to the edge. If a novel service needs
end-to-end support to deploy, either it fails to deploy, or it has to compromise and
use overlay network to work above the TCP/IP layer. The example for the former
situation is end-to-end QoS, which is still hard to achieve today. The example for
the latter situation includes end-to-end secure channel (e.g. VPN) and IPv6's tunnel
technology.
One reason to this obstacle, we believe, is the inadequacy of supporting an impor-
tant relationship in the Internet architecture { the economy relationship. This work
1If we consider the APARNET to be the origin of Internet.
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aims at introducing economics into the current Internet, and designing a platform
where the customers and providers can build explicit economic relationship. So that
the Internet can evolve better.
1.1 Introducing Economics to the Internet Architecture
There is undoubtedly some level of economy relationship in the current Internet.
The economy relationship is mostly established by the paper-based service contract
or peering agreements, which provide very limited choice to the customers, and are
unable to change within short period. On the other hand, the money ow in the
Internet is mostly owing from the edge to the core, that is, money are paid to
the local ISP, then the backbone carriers get their share from the edge. When new
network features are designed, there are often misalignment between protocol design
and economic motivation { since network operators are justiably driven by business
goals, they need to have clear incentives to support new network features. Two
examples of such misalignment is multicast and end-to-end QoS:
Multicast Multicast can reduce the network trac at the backbone carrier by send-
ing only one copy of packet to multiple receivers. However, backbone carriers
charge the peering ISPs by the amount of trac, so they are unwilling to invest
in equipments supporting multicast, which will in turn reduce their revenue [25].
End-to-end QoS End-to-end QoS requires the entire path to reserve the bandwidth
and priority of a ow. In an Internet scale, it is nearly impossible for an ISP to
set up service agreement to other arbitrary ISPs, not to mention such agreement
need to be per-ow and short term. Therefore, end-to-end QoS are dicult to
achieve at the Internet scale.
Therefore, there is a need for the network architecture to associate innovation
with economic motivation. In the work by Clark et al. [23], they emphasizes the
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importance of tying real-world tussles to the network architecture. To address these
challenges and expose economic tussles within the architecture, researchers from the
University of Massachusetts Amherst, the University of Kentucky, North Carolina
State University, and the University of North Carolina propose an \economy plane"
called ChoiceNet. It enables entities (e.g., users or their applications, providers,
etc.) to dynamically set up ne-grained, short-term economic contracts for network
services. These network services are oered and sold through marketplaces and can
range from simple connectivity (a la pathlets [33]) to complex processing and storage
services (e.g., caching for NDN [40]).
1.2 ChoiceNet Principles
The principles of the ChoiceNet has been described in the paper by Wolf et.al. [73].
This section briey introduces the three key principles of ChoiceNet:
Encourage alternatives. The architecture of network must allow alternative ser-
vices of the same type. The alternatives can be both technical (e.g. dierent
transmission protocol) and economical (e.g. the same video streaming from
dierent providers at dierent price). The service can range from infrastruc-
ture level such as alternative paths, to protocol level such as IP network vs.
NDN. With alternatives, customers can make choices based on to their own
requirements, thus encourage the competition between providers.
Know What Happened. After the customer has chosen a service, the architecture
must provide the customer a mechanism to evaluate the service. Customers
may nd out the service performance metrics through a monitoring method, or
nd out the reputation of a service from a ranking system. Only with the eval-
uation to the service (\introspection"), the customer can understand whether
the choice is good or not.
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Vote With Your Wallet. After the customer knows how the selected service per-
forms, the customer can choose to stick to the same service next time, or to
switch to a new service. Such vote with the wallet will force the providers to
oer services that match customers' needs. This iteration may happen at a very
ne grain (down to ow level) and short period (as short as seconds).
Sticking to the 3 principles, the architecture of ChoiceNet is described in Chap-
ter 2. With this \cycle of innovation," ChoiceNet is expected to prompt deployment
of innovative technologies throughout the Internet.
1.3 Challenges and Requirements
ChoiceNet is a comprehensive project, and this dissertation only covers some of
its components. This dissertation focuses on two aspect of the ChoiceNet: protocol
design and prototype implementation. To be specic, the following topics will be
covered: 1) service denition and protocol design, 2) marketplace design, 3) use
plane design, 4) path nding algorithm design, and 5) access control for services.
These topics cover most part of the ChoiceNet. Some of the key theoretical and
practical research challenges this work tries to address are:
1.3.1 Service Denition
 What is the proper abstraction for services, and how to propose a general enough
service description to include all the possible services?
 How can services be composed to form complex/tailored services?
1.3.2 Marketplace Design
 How should the interface between the marketplace and the provider/customer
be designed such that the service listing and requesting is easy, robust and
extensible?
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 How to use parallel design on marketplace to handle more request?
1.3.3 Use Plane Design
 What is the pricing strategy for services?
 How to support path and protocol alternative while maintaining compatibility
with existing end systems?
 How to evolve the traditional, distributed network protocols in the new central-
ized network?
 How to change the end system to communicate with marketplace without af-
fecting the upper layer applications?
 How to incrementally deploy ChoiceNet in the current Internet?
1.3.4 Path Finding Algorithm Design
 How to design a path nding algorithm that can nd Pareto-optimal paths in
multi-criteria networks?
 How to design it fast enough to nd all the Pareto-optimal paths within 1 second
on a typical sized network?
 How to nd a subset of the Pareto-optimal paths in shorter time when the full
Pareto-optimal set is not necessary?
1.3.5 Access Control for Services
 How to design an authentication scheme to forbid unauthorized use of services?
 How to make such scheme faster and use less memory?
 How to resist the DoS attack to the authentication scheme?
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1.4 Organization and Contributions
This dissertation focuses on ve of the research challenges discussed in Section 1.3:
service denition, marketplace design, use plane design, path nding algorithm and
access control. The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows, with the major
contributions summarized in each.
Chapter 2 introduces the design of the ChoiceNet architecture which were pub-
lished before. It introduces the key components of ChoiceNet, and the interactions
between the entities.
Chapter 3 presents a design of a service access protocol based on the establishment
of economic relationships between entities. We present a service description which
allows straightforward composition. A protocol of service is also proposed, which
denes the format of service listing, request and response.
Chapter 4 presents the detail of marketplace implementation. The APIs for cus-
tomers and providers are dened, the path nding algorithm is introduced, and the
parallel and distributed architecture of marketplace is proposed.
Chapter 5 discusses the use plane problems. Since the introduction of centralized
control plane, some traditional network protocols need to be modied. These include
neighborhood discovery, intra-domain routing and inter-domain routing. This chapter
presents updated algorithms to solve these problems. The ChoiceNet App is also
introduced in this Chapter, which is used on the end-system, interacting with the
marketplace while keeping compatibility with existing applications. This chapter
then proposes two hybrid deployment methods, to incrementally deploy ChoiceNet
in the current Internet.
Chapter 6 presents ParetoBFS, a new multi-criteria path nding algorithm for
ChoiceNet. This algorithm is a variant of the breadth-rst search (BFS) algorithm
and uses Pareto constraints to prune the traversal tree. Comparison with two existing
algorithms shows ParetoBFS is tens to hundreds times faster and nd more paths on
6
typical sized networks. This chapter also shows a sampling heuristic to decreases the
running time by only nding a subset of Pareto-optimal solutions.
Chapter 7 focuses on the service access control problem. An algorithm named
OrthCredential is proposed to prevent unauthorized access of service. OrthCredential
uses Hadamard matrices to verify packets along the path. It provides a fast and
memory ecient method for access control. It is also resistant to DoS attacks.
Chapter 8 describes the deployment on GENI { a test bed for network architec-
tures. Results from prototype deployment are provided.
Chapter 9 concludes the previous chapters.
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CHAPTER 2
CHOICENET ARCHITECTURE
As described in the introduction, the principle idea of ChoiceNet is to enable
market-based competition among providers of network services, which improves qual-
ity of oerings and reduces cost to customers. To enable a competitive market,
ChoiceNet introduces an explicit representation of economic relationships between
entities in the network.
This chapter describes ChoiceNet architecture and operations within it. The ar-
chitecture is designed by the entire ChoiceNet team, as described in [59,72,73]. It is
summarized here to provide the background needed to understand the specic topics
this work addresses in the following chapters.
2.1 Planes and Entities in ChoiceNet
Figure 2.1 shows the architecture of ChoiceNet. It is composed of the economy
plane and the use plane. The economy plane is where the transactions happen between
customers and providers. The use plane is where the services are realized based on
the contracts settled in the economy plane.
In the economy plane, the main entities are customers and providers. Customers
contact with providers for the access of services. One entity can act as both a customer
and a provider at the same time. For example, a customer can resell the purchased
service to others (either directly or as a bundle by adding other functions to it). The
expected output of the economy plane is the establishment of the contract between
the two entities.
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Figure 2.1. The architecture of ChoiceNet. [73]
In the use plane, the main entities are clients and providers. The provider will
set up the services for authorized clients based on the contract established in the
economy plane. The use plane contains the control and data plane like the current
Internet does, and the services are provisioned in the way that control plane sending
commands to data plane. Besides the service provisioning, the use plane also provides
a mechanism for the entities to check what happened in the use of the services (the
introspection). The providers can check whether the contract is valid (i.e. contract
validation) and whether the client is authorized to use services (i.e. access control).
On the other side, the clients can verify whether the delivered services meet the
agreement (i.e. service proof and measurement).
2.2 ChoiceNet Components
This section describes the three key components in ChoiceNet. Some detail ex-
planation can be found in latter chapters.
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2.2.1 Services
The concept of service is adopted from the service centric networking [7,60,69,70].
In service centric networks, functionalities in the network are viewed as \network ser-
vices" [26, 43, 69]. These services can be simple paths between nodes, and they can
be more complex protocol processing and content storage. Service-centric network
architectures then describe the semantics of various network services and allow com-
position of more complex services based on users' needs.
Services are generated by the local providers, then listed on the marketplace.
End-system users and providers of service composition then purchase services from
the marketplace. To create a competitive market for services, it is necessary to specify
the semantics of services such that service oerings can be compared. At the same
time, the semantics of services must be generic enough to allow adding new services.
Because all that a network service do is transferring data or modifying it, we dene
a service with 1) the locations of its input and output, and 2) the requirement of input
format and the transformations it will apply to the input. Such denition allows easy
composition of the services. The details of service denition and composition will be
explained in Chapter 3.
2.2.2 Contracts
In the current Internet, the economic relationships are based on long-term, \paper-
based" contracts. (e.g., monthly service agreements between users and network ser-
vice providers, service-level agreements between providers, etc.). ChoiceNet enables
contracts for network services at various time scales.
In ChoiceNet, contracts relate economic exchanges (e.g., payments) with opera-
tions within the network (e.g., access to a service). To be eective, contracts require
enforcement. Thus, a customer needs to be able to verify that a service has been
rendered to specication (e.g., as discussed in [6]) and a provider needs to be able
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to perform access control to limit services to those customers who have established
economic relationships. The latter is covered in Chapter 7.
2.2.3 Marketplaces
In order to choose, the customers need a place to nd what services are available.
The marketplace provides such a place where the providers can advertise services and
customers can query them. To allow comparison across dierent services, ChoiceNet
denes semantics for the service advertisement. There are mandatory attributes like
service type, price and provider information. There are also supplementary attributes
for each type of service, so that the customers can make choices based on them. The
marketplace can also support service composition (e.g., as discussed in [27]).
The marketplaces may also act as trusted intermediary for economic transactions.
It will reduce the risk of making payment to providers, and also help customers select
services based on ratings.
The marketplace serves a central role in the ChoiceNet. To avoid single point
failure and make the system scale up, multiple marketplaces may exist. They can
help o-loading with each other, and compete with each other if they belong to
dierent authorities.
Chapter 4 describes the design details of the marketplace.
2.3 ChoiceNet Interaction
This section introduces the interactions happen in ChoiceNet. Figure 2.2 shows
the space-time diagram of interactions about the service advertisement and request.
The steps taken to set up connections (or more complex service oerings) in
ChoiceNet are:
1. Providers advertise their services in one or more marketplaces.
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Figure 2.2. Space-time diagram of interactions in ChoiceNet. [21]
2. An end-system application (e.g., movie streaming app) queries the marketplace
for available service oerings (e.g., QoS pipes, cached content).
3. The user (or a delegated entity, such as the operating system) makes a decision
on which service to \purchase."
4. The providers involved in the service oerings set up their services in return for
\consideration."
5. The end-system application uses the provided service.
A key challenge in this context is to connect the economic relationship among en-
tities to the network services oered/purchased. In Chapter 4, we describe a protocol
that establishes this connection.
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CHAPTER 3
DEFINATION AND COMPOSITION OF SERVICES
At the heart of the ChoiceNet architecture is the concept of a network layer
service. ChoiceNet's goal is to enable anyone to create a new network layer service,
advertise the service to potential customers, provide the service, and be compensated
for providing the service. Moreover, a user/customer (or a reseller/broker) should
have the ability to combine network layer services together to form more complex
services tailored to the specic needs of the user.
For example, a network layer service might be as simple as a \relay service"
that forwards packets from one port on a switch to another port on a switch. A
broker might then combine relay services together to create a (composite) \pathlet
service" [34] that forwards packets along a particular path. Another broker might
oer a service that combines pathlet services together to form an \end-to-end packet
delivery service."
Although composed services have been explored in other contexts before [17, 39],
past work has focused on the problem of integrating functionality, rather than that of
compensating the operators of those services. A ChoiceNet network layer service not
only needs to dene \what the service does" so that it can be used/composed, but it
must also specify \what a user of the service must do to compensate the provider of
the service."
This chapter presents a network layer service abstraction for ChoiceNet, describe
how it can be composed to form complex/tailored services, and how to use the
ChoiceNet protocol for implementing the selection mechanism.
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Some of the material in this chapter have been published in [22].
3.1 Consideration
In ChoiceNet, all network layer services require some form of consideration along
with each service request. Consideration is the medium of exchange of value; that is,
consideration is used by one party to convince another to provide a good or service.
For practical reasons, the system must admit a variety of forms of consideration.1
Some connection to a system for transferring money may be required (e.g., a credit
card number or Bitcoin [54] transaction); in other cases a user may simply need
to prove membership in some group (e.g., being a faculty member at a particular
university). A receipt (proof of purchase) might also be accepted as consideration.
In short, consideration in ChoiceNet can be any form that the customer and provider
agree on for exchanging value.
3.2 Service Description and Composition
A network layer service description contains information about a service's char-
acteristics. It is used to advertise the service in the marketplace, and is also used by
planning services to compose services together. There are six parts to a network layer
service description: (1) the data transformation/operation, (2) the type of input re-
quire, (3) the type of output generated, (4) the input location, (5) the output location,
and (6) the consideration required. The rst three components|the operation, input
specication, and output specication|are similar to other interface description lan-
guages, web service denition languages, remote procedure calls, etc. The other three
components are needed by the economy plane to sell/purchase services and compose
them together.
1In some cases a network layer service might be oered for free and not require any particular
consideration.
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One can think of a network layer service as a channel with one or more input
endpoints and one or more output endpoints. When the specied consideration is
given along with request for service, the channel performs the specied operation,
(possibly) transforming data arriving on the input endpoint(s) into data leaving on
the output endpoint(s). The operation may also have side-eects (e.g., changing the
state of the channel).
Composition is achieved by connecting the output from one channel to the input
of another channel. However, it is not sucient to know that a service's output type
matches another service's input type. Channel endpoints need to be in the same loca-
tion so that they can be connected. Locations are simply identiers (names) selected
from some namespace (i.e., scope) meaningful to the network layer service (e.g., ID
of a switch, a port on switch, an AS number, an IP address, an ISP provider name,
a geo-location, etc.). Endpoints sharing a location are composable, with ChoiceNet
providing the functionality to connect output to input.
Network layer service descriptions are \advertised" by the network layer service
to the marketplace, where the marketplace is itself a set of marketplace services that
allow applications to browse or search the set of available services. Like all services,
access to marketplace services requires consideration. Given the ability to discover
available services (in the marketplace), one can implement planning services, which,
given a particular request for service, identify (plan) a composed service that will
meet the requirement. The planning service might then invoke provisioning services
that \purchase" the planned set of composed services (i.e., providing the necessary
consideration to each service), or it might return the plan to the user who would
invoke a provisioning service to \purchase" the composed service. This ability to
hierarchically compose services enables a variety of dierent business models including
resellers, aggregators, brokers, etc.
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3.3 ChoiceNet Protocol for Network Services
Conceptually, ChoiceNet services are \purchased" in the economy plane and \used"
in the use plane (i.e., control and/or data plane). One of the challenges is to devel-
op suitable protocols that enable both invocation of economy plane services and use
plane services. For example, communication in the economy plane is likely to re-
semble conventional request/reply, client-server communication. Communication in
the use plane, on the other hand, may take various forms, such as a client pushing
data through a series of transformation services. Thus, it might seem that ChoiceNet
should support two distinct communication protocols: one for customers purchasing
services from providers, and another for applications using services.
While the economy plane/use plane distinction is conceptually useful, the services
that are implemented in practice often cannot be easily classied as economy plane
or use plane services. A path service, for example, may collect information from
forwarding services to construct and sell paths and thus be considered a marketplace
(economy plane) service, but at the same time be considered a use plane service
because it computes and returns a set paths along with the \proof of purchase" needed
to use those paths. In other words, it both sells forwarding service and computes
paths, and this combination may be necessary to dynamically determine/set prices.
To embrace ChoiceNet's conceptual distinction between the economy plane and
the use plane, but allow services to play both roles at the same time, we designed a
single ChoiceNet communication protocol that is usable by services regardless of the
plane to which they belong (or fall between).
3.4 ChoiceNet Protocol Messages
In the ChoiceNet protocol, services are invoked with a service request and may
produce an output. Figure 3.1 shows the general structure of a request and output.
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Figure 3.1. Basic components of a ChoiceNet (a) Request and (b) Output message.
The request message is similar to a remote procedure call, indicating which service
should be invoked at the server and a list of arguments to be passed to the server.
Unlike remote procedure calls, a ChoiceNet request also carries consideration. A
generic service ags eld carries ags understood by all services (e.g., a \price check"
ag that allows a customer to learn the precise cost of performing tasks with a certain
set of parameters). The ags eld can also be used to indicate that certain elds will
be carried in the payload, rather than the header; this allows larger values to be
conveyed. Like the request message, the output message indicates for which service
it is providing results. The message may also carry the output from the service (e.g.,
a list of \proof-of-purchase" tokens for use with a forwarding service).
3.5 ChoiceNet Protocol Interactions
There are several ways of how this simple ChoiceNet protocol can be used to
create interactions that match realistic networking scenarios:
 Iterative use to enable choice: Choice is critical to enable service competition.
To let users choose among multiple services, repeated ChoiceNet protocol oper-
ations can be used: First, a marketplace is queried to obtain a list of available
services. The ChoiceNet protocol is used to send the query to the marketplace
(and possibly provide consideration in case the search needs to be paid for).
The marketplace returns the available services. In a second protocol exchange,
the user then contacts the provider of choice to purchase the actual service.
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 Recursive use for composed services: Network services may consist of several
pathlets and potential processing and storage services. A provider can hide
this complexity to a user by oering a single service. However, when a user
purchases this service, multiple subservices need to be instantiated for use. In
this case, the single ChoiceNet protocol interaction by the user may trigger
multiple, recursive ChoiceNet protocol interactions.
 \One-shot" use for speed: In cases where the user has already made the choice
of service, our ChoiceNet protocol can be used very eciently since all necessary
information (service selection and consideration) is included in a single protocol
message. Thus, this information can be included in-band with data transmission
and does not require additional messages between user and provider.
Note that all three scenarios use the same ChoiceNet protocol, but can achieve
dierent goals.
3.6 Specifying Service Semantics
Having dened a common message structure for messages in both the economy
and use planes, we ultimately need to dene precisely what goes into each eld of
the messages shown in Figure 3.1. Depending on the target service, the information
exchanged in these messages may range from simple ags and identiers (similar to
elds in an IP header) for forwarding services to complex XML structures for services
that process packet payloads. Clearly, the customers and providers must agree on the
meaning/semantics of the data carried in these elds. Much like there exist protocol
standards for the network and transport layers of the current Internet, we expect
similar standard will be dened for use/data plane services in ChoiceNet. However,
services in the economy plane may rely instead on agreed upon vocabularies to dene
the semantics of messages.
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To support a variety of dierent (extensible) vocabularies, we adopted a triple
f Attribute Name, Attribute Value, Vocabulary URL g as the general structure for
information being exchanged in the economy plane. Attribute Name identies the
import of the eld, and is a literal that must be interpreted the same way by entities
that exchange messages containing this attribute. That is, such entities must share
a common vocabulary. A vocabulary, in this context, may be a simple dictionary of
literals; the meaning or import of such literals is embedded in the logic of the entities
exchanging the message. More generally, it is an ontology, where some of the rules
for manipulation of such literals is embedded in the vocabulary itself. Examples of
Attribute Name values are ChoiceNet Version or Message Type.
Attribute Value is a literal that provides the value of the attribute named by the
Attribute Name. It may be a number, a string, a list, or it may nest a single, or
multiple, other elds (whose values, in turn, may nest others). This allows ChoiceNet
entities to ignore entire hierarchies of elds if they are not relevant to the entity's
current role or interaction. In other words, an entity may understand the import of a
message completely at the top level, without understanding all of the detail structure
(but being able to pass them on, say, to another entity). For example, the concept of
consideration can simply be represented by an attribute eld with Attribute Value set
to Consideration. Its value can be a nested structure, representing many dierent
methods of transferring consideration such as mechanisms like PayPal, or previously
established contexts like an account number to charge, or credit mechanisms like
credit card numbers. Similarly, complex concepts like tokens can be encapsulated in
single attribute elds with internal structure that can vary from use to use.
Finally, Vocabulary URL provides the basis for an extensible vocabulary, by al-
lowing the sender of the message to indicate where the vocabulary being used for the
value of the Attribute Value is available. It may well be that this vocabulary is the
same as that needed to understand this eld's Attribute Name itself, but the ability to
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specify a dierent vocabulary for any eld's Attribute Value allows providers of inno-
vative services to immediately start using existing ChoiceNet marketplaces and other
mechanisms, and incrementally build an ecosystem of other entities who understand
the new custom vocabulary.
From the above, it is clear that services that rely on vocabularies must a priori
understand all top-level attribute eld Attribute Name values { this represents the
bootstrapping vocabulary, and can be considered the common core vocabulary. This
common core can be minimal. Further, we reasonably expect that the core vocabulary
will grow over time, as practice makes it clear what vocabularies are most helpful to
the ChoiceNet user community.
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CHAPTER 4
MARKETPLACE
The marketplace is basically a server which accepts providers' advertisements
and responds to customers' request. It is the intermediary of service, payment and
trust. In this implementation, it is also responsible for the service composition. This
chapter introduces the architecture of the marketplace, and how it interacts with the
customers and providers.
4.1 The Architecture of Marketplace
In this implementation, the marketplace is a multi-threaded server written in
Python, with MySQL as its database. The architecture of a single marketplace server
is shown in Figure 4.1. To make the server scalable, it is designed to be multi-threaded.
Every time a provider or a customer connects to the server, a new thread is created
to handle the request.
The marketplace uses standard sockets to accept connections from the clients
(i.e. the provider or the customer). To reduce the deployment complexity, there is
only one persistent connection for each client, which is initiated by the client side.
The requests and responses are encoded in JSON1 text format. JSON is ideal for
key-value pair representation, and it is easy to keep compatibility between dierent
protocol versions. Two mandatory keys in the request and the response are version
and command, representing the version of ChoiceNet protocol used and the name
1http://json.org/
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Figure 4.1. The architecture of marketplace server.
of the current command, respectively. Each command has its own extensive key
denition, some examples of the key denitions are shown in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1.
#request
{
"ver": 0.1,
"rpc_id": "0",
"command": "client_connect",
"client_type": "user",
"client_id": "2fb5e13419fc89246865e7a324f476ec624e8740"
}
#response
{
"ver": 0.1,
"rpc_id": "0",
"command": "client_connect",
"response": True
}
Figure 4.2. JSON representation of a request and a response.
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The communication between the marketplace and the clients is plain text for now.
If there are security concerns, Transport Layer Security (TLS) can be used to encrypt
the text, but this is not included in the current version of ChoiceNet protocol.
The requests are designed like remote procedure calls (RPC). Every request has
a response. The request is synchronized, that is, the request halts until the response
arrives. To prevent blocking by unpredictable failures, there is a 5 seconds timeout
for each request.
Though the marketplace will never actively end a connection, a long-lived TCP
connection may be unexpectedly torn apart by the client side or by network failures.
To keep alive the TCP connection, the client sends a check_marketplace_status
request to the marketplace every 20 seconds as a heartbeat. If the marketplace has not
received any request from the client for 60 seconds, it assumes the client is dropped
and end the connection.
The marketplace currently only oers one type of service|the pathlet service.
It is a directional path dened by the location of source and destination, which are
IP addresses. An example of pathlet service is shown in Figure 4.2. Note that the
description varies for dierent service types, and the JSON representation ensures the
extendibility in the future.
To handle payments, there is a web server co-located with the marketplace to
perform authentication with PayPal. This web server interacts with the marketplace
by sharing its database and exposes a HTTP-based JSON API to user applications
for PayPal payments.
4.2 Pathlet Service Composition
The marketplace is responsible to compose the pathlet services. Each time the
marketplace receives a new pathlet service reported by the provider, it stores it in the
database. When the marketplace receives a service planning request, it constructs a
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Table 4.2. Pathlet service example.
Attribute Name Attribute Value
service id 511d8dc5821e2b88495737ef6642e7461108955a
name Link 10.1.0.2-10.3.0.2
description 1.00 Mbps, 15.00 ms latency, 0.01 USD/min
quantity 1
service type NetworkLink
controller id 2fb5e13419fc89246865e7a324f476ec624e8740
controller ip 192.168.0.15
end point1 id 10.1.0.2
end point1 ip 10.1.0.2
end point2 id 10.3.0.2
end point2 ip 10.3.0.2
service bandwidth 1.0
service latency 15.0
service cost 0.01
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Figure 4.3. Inter-thread communication.
directional multi-graph from the pathlet services. It then uses the ParetoBFS algo-
rithm to nd all the Pareto-optimal paths, the detail of the ParetoBFS algorithm is
presented in Chapter 6. After nding all the Pareto-optimal paths, they are presented
to users for selection.
4.3 Inter-thread Communication
Sometimes, information needs to be shared between threads in marketplace. For
example, when a thread receives a service provisioning request from a customer, it
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needs to inform the provider's thread to start the service provisioning. Similarly,
when the provisioning is done, a notication needs to be sent back to inform the
customer. These all require an inter-thread communication scheme.
In this implementation, a message queue is used for inter-thread communication,
as shown in Figure 4.3. Each thread has a thread ID, which is the same as the client
ID that thread serves. Each message is a JSON string (similar to the marketplace
communication protocol), and has a source thread ID and a destination thread ID.
To handle messages, each thread registers a listener function in the message queue.
When a message is sent to the message queue, all the threads will be able to see it,
and the specied destination thread will be responsible to handle it. If the destination
thread ID is a broadcast ID, all the threads will handle it.
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CHAPTER 5
USE PLANE DESIGN
To leverage and maintain compatibility with existing applications, the use plane
needs to be based on the IP protocol. A fundamental requirement of ChoiceNet is
to support alternative paths. In particular, ChoiceNet needs to support per-ow dy-
namic routing based on the user/application's requirements, but legacy static routing
and adaptive routing does not meet these requirements.
There are more than one way to implement such dynamic routing in the use
plane. The University of Kentucky team has implemented a source routing based
implementation in [22] using the Click modular router [44]. This work uses another
approach, which is using Software Dened Networking (SDN).
SDN is an approach that decouples network systems into the control plane and the
data plane [56]. Such decoupling enables the control plane to control each ow with
exibility. Using SDN, we can allocate the path for each ow by installing ow entries
on switches along designated path. This approach allows providers in ChoiceNet to
provision path services to users.
The use plane consists of the control plane and the data plane. This chapter
introduces the control logic in the control plane, and how it manages the network
in a centralized way while keeping the compatibility of end systems. This chapter
also introduces the application installed on end systems { the ChoiceNet App, which
manipulates packets and interacts with the marketplace.
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5.1 Control Plane Design
The controller is the representative of the provider. Each provider domain (e.g.
an Autonomous System) has a controller. In this implementation, the controller is
an SDN controller with customized control logic. It detects the topology of switches
with LLDP packets and detects hosts by their DHCP, ARP, and IP packets. When
a new host or a new link has been detected, the controller updates the new pathlet
service to the marketplace, thus the marketplace knows all the services in all ASes.
Another task of the controller is provisioning { once a provisioning request is received,
the controller installs ow entries on the switches along the designated path.
The main dierence in paradigm of a controller in ChoiceNet and a standard SDN
controller is: the installation of ow table entries is not triggered by the rst packet
of each ow. Instead, ow table entry installations are triggered by the provision-
ing command from the marketplace{after the users have requested and paid for the
service.
5.1.1 Host Discovery in ChoiceNet
One dierence between ChoiceNet and the traditional Internet is: ChoiceNet has
to have loops inside the network to provide alternative path, and the loops should
not be removed by spanning tree protocol. Therefore, broadcast protocols such as
ARP must be handled dierently to avoid broadcast storm. This section describes
how the IP addresses are discovered and resolved in ChoiceNet:
 Each AS has a virtual gateway, which is used to keep compliant with the end
system's gateway settings. It has a virtual IP and MAC, which doesn't have to
be real.
 When an end system joins the network, it either 1) uses DHCP to get an IP
address and the gateway setting, so the controller can know the existence of the
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end system, or 2) uses static IP address, the controller can know the existence
of the end system by detecting its ARP and IP packets.
 When an ARP request is received by an edge switch, the switch does not ood
it to other ports. Instead, it sends the packet to the controller. Because the
virtual gateway is congured as all the end systems' rst hop, the destination
IP of the request should be either a host within the same layer 2 network, or
the virtual gateway's IP. In either condition, the controller has the record of the
requested IP and its MAC address. It then dictates the edge switch to directly
reply this ARP request.
 Because the MAC address may be virtual, the packets may not be accepted by
the NIC when they reach a layer 3 router or reach the destination host. To
solve this problem, when the controller installs ow entries into the switches, if
the MAC address of the destination IP is known by the controller, it will add
a \modify destination MAC" action in the ow entry of the last hop, to make
sure the router or host's NIC can receive the packet.
5.1.2 Inter-domain routing
The inter-domain routing is done by the controller. Whenever a new host joins,
the controller calculates the path between the new host and existing hosts as well
as peering ports to other ASes. The controller then reports the paths as pathlet
services to the marketplace. Since the controller knows the topology of the entire AS,
given both ends, it is easy to use Breadth First Search algorithm to nd all the paths
between them. The paths are named by the IP address of the two ends, connected
by a enumerate number to distinguish multiple path between the same end points,
e.g. \10.1.0.2 0 10.3.0.2".
The pathlet services also include parameters about the link quality, such as through-
put, latency and drop rate. These are manually congured in this implementation,
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but they can be automatically detected by the method introduced in A. C. Babaoglu
et al.'s work [5].
When a host disconnects, the controller will detect this through timeout scheme,
then delete the corresponding pathlet services related to that host. The same applies
to paths disconnection between switches.
5.1.3 Intra-domain routing
To achieve the peering between ASes, there are exchange points which connect
two or more ASes. The exchange point works at layer 2 network, and each AS know
other AS's peering port IP, either by manual conguration, or by the protocol intro-
duced in SDX [35]. The controller consider the peering ports as \virtual hosts," and
reports pathlet services between the host and peering ports' IP. The service is report-
ed asymmetrically: the outgoing pathlet service is from the host IP to the other AS's
peering port's IP, and the incoming pathlet service is from local AS's peering port's
IP to the host IP. For example, in Figure 5.1, AS1 will report 10.0.0.2 0 10.1.0.1 and
10.0.0.2 0 10.2.0.1 as the outgoing pathlets, and 10.0.0.1 0 10.0.0.2 as the incoming
pathlet. In this way, the marketplace can naturally compose the multiple segments
of each path direction.
5.2 ChoiceNet App Design
On the user's system, to avoid rewriting every application to communicate to
the marketplace, a program called ChoiceNet App is used to intercept out-going
connections and to contact the marketplace on behalf of the application. A lot of
solutions can be used to intercept packets, such as Windows Filtering Platform [47],
NetFilter Queue1, Intel DPDK2, or writing a customized kernel module or driver.
1http://www.netfilter.org/projects/libnetfilter_queue/
2http://dpdk.org/
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Figure 5.1. Peering between multiple AS.
This implementation uses NetFilter Queue for packet interception, because it can
easily manipulate packet from the user space.
Figure 5.2 shows the function of the ChoiceNet App. It intercepts the initial
packet of the desired type of connections (e.g. connections with destination port 80
if one want to make HTTP trac to use ChoiceNet). The App then contacts the
marketplace, asking for a path service to the destination IP. After the marketplace
returns a list of available service combinations, the App prompts the user to select
one service. After the selection, the user is redirected to a PayPal payment page.
After receiving the payment notication from PayPal, the marketplace transfers the
money to the account of the controller(s) and noties the latter to provision the
services. After the provisioning, the App releases the intercepted packet and trac
will traverse through the assigned path.
It may be impractical for the user to select and pay for each network connection.
Instead, network services can be made more granular (e.g., encompassing all connec-
tions to a video service provider for 2 hours) and preferences can be specied in the
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Figure 5.2. ChoiceNet App interactions on end system. [22]
ChoiceNet App to automate the service selection process. A \prepaid" account can
be set up in the marketplace to avoid frequent PayPal authentication, too.
5.3 Incremental Deployment in Legacy Network
The previous sections discussed about the details in a pure ChoiceNet environ-
ment. However, it is impossible to deploy the ChoiceNet in one night. For one, SDN
is not available end-to-end on the Internet; for another, the deployment pace of each
provider are dierent. Therefore, an incremental deployment method is necessary, so
that users can make use of the economy plane even if the core of Internet is still lega-
cy network. We proposes two hybrid deployment method in two dimensions: hybrid
architecture and hybrid application.
5.3.1 Hybrid architecture
Since ChoiceNet keeps the compatibility of the IP layer, it can connect to the
legacy with no problem. As shown in Figure 5.3, if one edge provider supports
ChoiceNet architecture, its users can have choices both within the AS and outside
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Figure 5.3. Hybrid architecture of ChoiceNet and the traditional Internet.
the AS. When the user is requesting a service, it can choose between local servers
and remote servers (e.g. choose between Server1,Server2 and Server3), they can also
choose from dierent egress link quality. The user here can be either a single host,
or an NAT LAN using legacy network. As long as the user machine has ChoiceNet
App deployed, it can make some level of choice.
5.3.2 Hybrid application
Making all the protocols negotiating with marketplace before transmission is ex-
pensive, and not all applications on the user side need an economy plane. The
ChoiceNet App can set up rules in iptables to separate legacy trac and the trac
that wants economy plane. For example, if a user wants only online video trac to
use economy plane, a rule can be set up in iptables, sending only the packets that has
the video server as the destination IP and port to NFQueue. Legacy trac can still
be routed through SDN and other parts of Internet using traditional routing method.
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CHAPTER 6
MULTI-CRITERIA PATH FINDING ALGORITHM
Path nding algorithm is a fundamental functionality in ChoiceNet. In the use
plane, the providers need to nd paths within its domain. In the marketplace, the
pathlet services form a graph, and the service composition is also achieved by path
nding algorithms. Onur et al. have proposed a scalable architecture for path compu-
tation [3], but it does not introduce any specic path nding algorithm. This chapter
will focus on the algorithmic foundations for eciently computing alternative paths
in ChoiceNet.
Routing in the current Internet uses a single criterion, such as hop count or link
weight. Although there are proposed solutions to the multi-criteria optimal path
selection problem for quality-of-service routing, since the routers eventually need to
pick only one path, they usually combine all criteria into a single path optimization
metric a priori.
These traditional routing methods, however, do not apply to ChoiceNet, because
a single metric cannot provide path alternatives to customers that weigh metrics a
posteriori. ChoiceNet's routing algorithm must be able to consider more than one
criterion (e.g. bandwidth, delay, price) and provide paths representing trade-os
between dierent criteria. On the other hand, the marketplace should remain neutral
when oering services, thus, the routing algorithm must provide all the Pareto-optimal
paths to the customers.
This chapter presents ParetoBFS, a variant of a breadth-rst search that uses
branch and bound techniques to nd all the Pareto-optimal paths while eectively
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limiting the potentially very large search space. We present several sampling tech-
niques to further increase the speed of the search while degrading the quality of the
results only marginally. The simulation results show that existing multi-criteria com-
binatorial optimization approaches can only search a small fraction of all the Pareto-
optimal paths while our ParetoBFS can obtain the whole Pareto-optimal path set in
shorter time.
Some of the material in this chapter have been published in [20].
6.1 Introduction
Routing, which is determining a path for trac to ow between communicating
end-systems, is one of the essential functionalities of any computer network. In typical
networks, routing is based on a single criterion, such as path length, delay, or an
articially dened \weight." Widely used routing protocols, such as OSPF [53] and
RIP [38], use single routing metrics and corresponding routing algorithms, such as
Dijkstra's algorithm [24] and the Bellman-Ford algorithm [12], to eciently determine
the optimal path between two network nodes.
However, in ChoiceNet, single-criterion shortest paths no longer t the whole spec-
trum of services. The cost of a path and the quality of a path need to be represented
by independent metrics. When only a single metric is used, a single optimal solution
(i.e., shortest path) is enough. But when multiple metrics are used, a set of paths
needs to be found to represent the trade-os among criteria. A key challenge for
realizing multi-criterion path nding is the need to develop an ecient algorithm for
determining suitable paths in the potentially very large space of all possible paths (ex-
ponential to the number of nodes). The multi-criteria path nding is an NP-hard [36]
problem, but it is possible to develop solutions for typical-sized networks that work
well in practice.
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Previous work has addressed the multi-criteria optimal path problem in various
contexts, for example Quality of Service (QoS) routing. A central problem in QoS
routing is to nd feasible paths between a source and a destination that satisfy mul-
tiple constraints (e.g., bandwidth, delay). Then, the best path among the feasible
paths is selected based on a given optimization metric (e.g., delay-constrained least-
cost path routing). When there are multiple optimization metrics, most approaches
rely on an combinatorial optimization function [48], which combines all metrics into
a single metric (e.g., weighted sum).
Using a single, combined metric simplies the path nding problem, but also
presents a fundamental limit on the ability to nd solutions: a single optimization
metric requires a priori weighing of each metric [28]. That is, before the path nding
algorithm is run, the relative \value" between dierent metrics needs to be set. The
result of the search is then optimal (only) for this xed weighing of metrics. In
ChoiceNet, however, this weighing cannot be done a priori, and the multi-criteria
optimal path problem needs to nd the set of all Pareto-optimal paths. A path is
Pareto-optimal if there is no other path that is better in all metrics. Since multiple
metrics allow for the existence of paths that are better than others in one or more
metric, but not all, there can be a large number of mutually Pareto-optimal paths.
Based on the set of Pareto-optimal paths, one path can be chosen for any possible
weighing of metrics by the customer.
This chapter presents ParetoBFS, a variant of the breadth-rst search (BFS)
algorithm that uses Pareto constraints to prune the traversal tree. Experiments show
that ParetoBFS can nd all Pareto-optimal paths in a network in a reasonable time
since typical-sized networks do not exhibit the characteristics that cause the problem
space to become intractable. The specic contributions of this work are:
 The ParetoBFS algorithm that can nd the entire set of Pareto-optimal paths
in a network where the edges have arbitrary number of metrics, both sum-
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and bottleneck-type, which cannot be achieved by most of existing approaches.
Comparison with two existing algorithms shows ParetoBFS is tens to hundreds
times faster and nd more paths.
 A sampling heuristic for ParetoBFS that reduces the number of elements in the
set of Pareto-optimal solutions and thus decreases the complexity of the path
nding process. We show that despite not yielding all optimal solutions, this
heuristic still yields solutions that are useful in practice.
 Results from simulation on both realistic and generated network topologies, as
well as deployment in the ChoiceNet prototype.
We believe that this work provides a practical foundation for systematically using
multi-criteria path nding in ChoiceNet.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 describes back-
ground in the area. Section 6.3 provides the formal description of the multi-criteria
path nding problem. Section 6.4 describes the ParetoBFS algorithm. Section 6.5
presents the complexity analysis and experimental results. Section 6.6 introduces sev-
eral sampling heuristics for ParetoBFS. Section 6.7 compares ParetoBFS with related
work. Finally, Section 6.8 summarizes the key points of this chapter.
6.2 Background
Multi-criteria path nding has been studied extensively in the operations research
community. This problem arises in many practical applications, including route plan-
ning in trac networks [11] and QoS routing and trac engineering in communication
networks [65]. If the goal is to nd the optimal path with some constraints on one or
more metrics given a directed graph with edges that have a set of metrics, it is called
multi-constrained path optimization (MCPO) [19, 29, 45, 48, 63, 66, 74]. Without the
constraints on the metrics, this problem then becomes the multi-criteria optimization
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(MCO) problem [28, 36, 48, 58]. Solutions to MCPO and MCO are usually similar in
that they use a combinatorial function on the multiple metrics (a priori) to nd the
optimal path.
The goal of ParetoBFS is to nd all the Pareto-optimal paths, which is dierent
from the prior work. Therefore, ParetoBFS is a broader solution to address both
MCPO and MCO problems since the resulting paths from previous approaches are
usually a subset of the Pareto-optimal path set. These Pareto-optimal paths are
important in many scenarios. For example, references [42] and [30] each describe a
standalone routing service module that provides paths for other modules. Thus, the
routing service module itself cannot make any choice for metric preferences. Also,
in networks where paths are charged by their qualities, such as ChoiceNet [71], the
cost and the quality of a path need to be represented by independent metrics. In
these problems, there is no single objective function to select the best path, and it is
impossible to give the paths an a priori ranking. Instead, the decision maker needs
to see all the Pareto-optimal paths. Each Pareto-optimal path represents a trade-o
between criteria, and may be equally important for the decision entity.
Section 6.7 compares the performance of ParetoBFS with some prior work in
detail. The experiments show ParetoBFS is tens to hundreds times faster and can
solve broader range of problems.
6.3 Problem Statement
Before describing the ParetoBFS algorithm in Section 6.4, we briey introduce
the network model and describe the formal denition of our path nding problem.
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6.3.1 System Model
We model the network as a directed graph G = (V;E), where V is the set of nodes
and E is the set of edges interconnecting the nodes. n and m are the cardinalities of
V and E, i.e., n = jV j, m = jEj, respectively.
To make the problem general enough, we consider that G is a directed multi-
graph, which means there can be multiple edges between each node pair. (In practice,
these multiple edges can correspond to dierent services that are oered on the same
physical link, such as dierent QoS congurations.) In addition, we assume that
each edge feu;vju; v 2 V g 2 E is associated with an edge criteria vector w(u; v) =
(w1; w2; :::; wk), where k is the number of criteria. Each wi corresponds to one of the
independent criteria used in routing, such as bandwidth, latency, packet pass rate
and cost. A path p from a source vp1 to a destination v
p
r is dened as a nite sequence
of edges that connects a sequence of vertices (vp1; v
p
2; :::; v
p
r ), v
p
i(ir) 2 V .
The path p can be assigned a path criteria vector wp = fwp1; wp2; :::; wpkg. In this
paper, the calculation of the path criteria vector must satisfy the following property:
when a hop is added to the path's end, the optimality of the new path does not
increase on any criterion. Criteria satisfying this property can usually be classied
into two types: sum-type criterion (e.g., delay) where wpi =
P
eu;v2pwi(u; v); and
bottleneck-type criterion (e.g., bandwidth) where wpi = min(wi(u; v))
1.
6.3.2 Pareto-optimal Path
To dene Pareto-optimality, we rst dene a dominant path as follows. We use
the notation  to denote the left operand is more optimal than or equals to the right
operand.
Denition 1 (Dominant path) path p dominates path q if and only if
1There are also multiplicative criteria (e.g. link reliability, packet loss rate), but they can be
transformed into sum-type criteria by using a logarithm.
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AB
C
D
E
F
1024, 5, 2
2048, 4, 2
2048, 3, 3
512, 2, 4
2048, 2, 5
1024, 5, 2
2048, 5, 5
2048, 5, 2
1024, 4, 2
p1 =(A,B,D,F):   512, 12,   8  
p2 =(A,C,E,F): 1024, 10,   9
p3 =(A,B,E,F): 1024, 14,   6
p4 =(A,C,E,D,F): 2048, 16, 14
p5 =(A,B,E,D,F):   1024, 20, 11
p6 =(A,B,C,E,F): 1024, 14, 12
p7 =(A,B,C,E,D,F):1024, 20, 17
 Path list at node F:
 Pareto- 
optimal path.
 Not Pareto- 
optimal and 
discarded.
Criteria:
bandwidth, delay, cost
Figure 6.1. Example of Pareto-optimal path computation from node A to F.
wpi  wqi ; 8i 2 f1; 2; :::; kg:
and the strict inequality holds at least once.
Then we can dene Pareto-optimality as:
Denition 2 (Pareto-optimal path) Path set P is called a Pareto-optimal set if and
only if
p does not dominate q; 8p; q 2 P:
A path in a Pareto-optimal set is called a Pareto-optimal path.
In this paper, the goal is to nd all the Pareto-optimal paths from a source node to
a target node in a given graph G. For instance, if each edge e 2 E has three metrics:
bandwidth (w1), delay (w2) and cost (w3), then the set of the Pareto-optimal paths
P , which we nally nd out, satises that, for 8pi; pj 2 P;wpi1 > wpj1 _ wpi2 <
wpi2 _ wpi3 < wpj3 . This is dierent from the conventional multi-constrained optimal
path problem [48], where a path optimization function f p is used to combine all the
metrics together and the optimal path is found by calculating the value of f p on each
path. As discussed above, the optimal path computed based on a single aggregated
metric may not meet the multiple constraints being considered.
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An example of the type of result we are aiming to obtain is shown in Figure 6.1.
The edges of the graph are labeled with their respective metrics comprising of band-
width (w1), delay (w2) and cost (w3). There are seven paths (p1; p2:::; p7) from source
node A to destination node F . Among these paths, path p2 = (A;C;E; F ) is strictly
more optimal than path p5 = (A;B;E;D; F ) because w
p2
2 < w
p5
2 and w
p2
3 < w
p5
3 while
wp21 = w
p5
1 . Therefore, path p5 is not a Pareto-optimal path and would be discarded.
Similarly, neither of the paths p6 and p7 are not Pareto-optimal paths because p2
and p3 is strictly more optimal than them. Finally, we get the Pareto-optimal paths
p14. (In the ParetoBFS algorithm, we maintain a list on each node to record all the
Pareto-optimal paths to this node and their corresponding parameters. Such a list is
shown in black on node F in Figure 6.1.)
6.4 ParetoBFS: Pruning with Pareto Constraints
In this section, we rst describe the plain breadth rst search (BFS) solution to
the multi-criteria path nding problem. Then, we describe how we use pruning to
reduce the running time of the algorithm to a practical level.
6.4.1 Plain BFS to Find All Paths
A brute force solution to the multi-criteria path nding problem is to enumerate
all the possible paths, then extract the Pareto-optimal set from them.
Algorithm 1 shows a variant of BFS algorithm that nds all the simple paths
from the source node to a target node. Unlike the normal BFS, it does not maintain
\visited" tags on the nodes, because a node may be visited multiple times when
the algorithm examines dierent paths. Algorithm 1 starts from a source node and
enqueues it into a path queue, i.e., path queue. Then, the source node is dequeued
and all the directed edges of it are enqueued into path queue as new paths from
the source node to some node in the graph. Each time a path is dequeued from
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Algorithm 1 BFS that nds Pareto-optimal paths by enumerating all the simple
paths between two nodes
1: procedure BFS(G; source; target)
2: for all v 2 G(v) do
3: path set[v] ;
4: end for
5: path queue:push([source])
6: while path queue:length > 0 do
7: path path queue:pop()
8: s1 path:end()
9: for all edge 2 s1:out edges() do
10: s2 edge:dest node()
11: if s2 62 path then
12: new path path:append(edge)
13: path set[s2] path set[s2][
fnew pathg
14: if s2 6= target then
15: path queue:push(new path)
16: end if
17: end if
18: end for
19: end while
20: pareto set ;
21: for all path 2 path set[target] do
22: pareto set pareto add(pareto set; path)
23: end for
24: return pareto set
25: end procedure
path queue, it is stored into the path set corresponding to its last node. Meanwhile,
the out-edge neighbors of the dequeued path's last node are added to its end to
form new paths. These new paths are further enqueued into path queue. To prevent
loops, Line 11 checks whether the neighbor is already in the path before appending
it. After repeating this enqueue and dequeue process until path queue is empty,
path set contains all the simple paths2 from source node to all other nodes. Selecting
2A simple path is a path which does not have repeating nodes.
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Algorithm 2 See if a path is Pareto-optimal for a Pareto-optimal set. If it is, add it
to the set. It may evict existing paths from the set.
1: procedure pareto add(pareto set; new path)
2: result set ;
3: for all path 2 pareto set do
4: if path is strictly more optimal than new path then
5: return pareto set
6: else if new path is not strictly more optimal than path then
7: result set:append(path)
8: end if
9: end for
10: result set:append(new path)
11: return result set
12: end procedure
Number of nodes
5 10 15 20 25
N
um
be
r o
f p
at
hs
 tr
av
er
se
d
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
BFS
ParetoBFS
(a) Traversed paths.
Number of nodes
5 10 15 20 25
R
un
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
(se
co
nd
s)
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
(b) Running time.
Figure 6.2. ParetoBFS and BFS comparison.
a Pareto-optimal set from it is straightforward, as shown in function pareto add of
Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 can be easily extended to nd the Pareto-optimal paths from one
source node to all the other nodes, by replacing Line 13 with a pareto add function,
removing Line 14, and doing Lines 20 - 23 on each node.
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The algorithm is obviously not scalable. In a directed graph, the number of possi-
ble paths is usually exponential to the number of nodes. Moreover, for a multi-graph
with p parallel edges between each pair of nodes, the total number of paths increases
with a factor of ph, where h is the number of hops in a path. Figure 6.2 shows the
comparison with respect to the number of traversed paths and running time for Pare-
toBFS and BFS. It is run on BRITE-generated topologies, with 2 metrics and 1 par-
allel edge. The result is average over 60 runs with dierent graphs and source/target
nodes. Figure 6.2(a) shows the number of paths traversed in Algorithm 1. It grows
exponentially; enumerating all the possible paths is typically not feasible in both time
and space. To make Algorithm 1 practical, it is necessary to prune the space of paths
that are considered during the traversal.
6.4.2 ParetoBFS { Pruning While Searching
Since our goal is to nd Pareto-optimal paths, we can stop considering a path if
it is already strictly worse than other known paths. We call this process pruning.
Formally, during the search process, a path ending with node vi can be pruned if
either of the following conditions satises:
1. The path is dominated by a path in the Pareto-optimal path set with destination
node vi.
2. The path is dominated by a path in the Pareto-optimal path set with destination
node target.
An algorithm with such pruning maintains the same theoretical worst-case time
and space complexity. In practice, however, pruning reduces the size of the search tree
dramatically. Note that pruning does not aect the correctness of the nal solution,
because extension cannot make a suboptimal path optimal.
Applying the pruning method to Algorithm 1, we can get the ParetoBFS algorithm
as shown in Algorithm 3. Instead of saving all the paths, a set pareto set is used
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Algorithm 3 ParetoBFS
1: procedure ParetoBFS(G; source; target)
2: for all v 2 G(v) do
3: pareto set[v] ;
4: end for
5: path queue:push([source])
6: while path queue:length > 0 do
7: path path queue:pop()
8: s1 path:end()
9: if path is Pareto-optimal for pareto set[target] and path 2 pareto set[s1]
then
10: . Check whether the path satises the Pareto-optimal conditions
11: for all edge 2 s1:out edges() do
12: s2 edge:dest node()
13: if s2 62 path then
14: new path path:append(edge)
15: if new path is Pareto-optimal to pareto set[target] and
pareto set[s2] then
16: . see if new path can be added into the Pareto-optimal
path set to node s2
17: pareto add(pareto set[s2],
new path)
18: if s2 6= target then
19: path queue:push(new path)
20: end if
21: end if
22: end if
23: end for
24: else
25: continue
26: end if
27: end while
28: return pareto set[target]
29: end procedure
to save the Pareto-optimal paths from the source node to each node. It diers from
Algorithm 1 in Lines 9, 15 and 17. Lines 15 and 17 check the Pareto-optimality before
the enqueue step, to eliminate any suboptimal path. There is another check after the
dequeue step in Line 9, because the Pareto-optimal sets may have changed during
the time that path stays in the queue. Figure 6.2(a) shows that the pruning method
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can eectively reduce the number of traversed paths by several orders of magnitude.
The detailed performance and complexity analysis is shown in Section 6.5.
Algorithm 3 can be extended to nd Pareto-optimal paths to all other nodes, by
removing the condition checks involving the target Pareto-optimal set in Lines 9, 15
and 18. The running time increases because of the less strict pruning conditions.
6.5 Evaluation and Complexity Analysis
In this section, we discuss the eectiveness of our ParetoBFS algorithm in the
context of network graphs to show that it is practically useful.
6.5.1 Methodology
To test the performance of the path nding algorithm, we use both generated
topology and real-world topology. Although ParetoBFS can apply to both inter-
and intra-AS topologies, most of the intelligent routing applications are used within
private domains. So we focus on the intra-AS topology here. We use the BRITE
topology generator [52] to generate router-level topologies. The sizes of the topologies
range from 100 nodes to 10,000 nodes. BRITE provides three metrics for paths:
length, bandwidth and latency. When testing with more than 3 metrics, we add
extra random parameters besides these 3 metrics.
BRITE provides four generation models: Waxman [67], BA [9], BA-2 [1] and
GLP [15](the GLP model is mainly for AS-level topologies). The node placement has
two options: random and heavy-tailed. The bandwidth distribution has four options:
constant, uniform, exponential and heavy-tailed. We test all the combinations on
graphs with 1,000 nodes, 3 metrics and 1 parallel edge. We list the running time
(seconds) and the Pareto-optimal path count in Table 6.1. Each result is an average of
100 runs. It can be observed that, except for the constant options, other combinations
of parameters do not show signicant dierence in the path nding result. Therefore,
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Table 6.1. Dierent BRITE parameters' impact.
Node
Placement
Bandwidth
Distribution
Model
Waxman BA BA-2 GLP
time paths time paths time paths time paths
Random
Constant 0.03 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.03 1.00
Uniform 0.36 7.46 0.26 5.22 0.64 7.42 0.12 2.24
Exponential 0.36 6.60 0.23 4.16 0.62 7.22 0.09 1.94
HeavyTailed 0.42 6.64 0.28 4.84 0.68 7.40 0.12 2.36
Heavy Tailed
Constant 0.04 1.00 0.05 1.00 0.08 1.00 0.03 1.00
Uniform 0.59 8.46 0.37 5.24 0.89 7.78 0.15 1.98
Exponential 0.52 7.22 0.30 5.78 0.81 7.96 0.15 2.46
HeavyTailed 0.48 7.62 0.25 4.68 0.84 7.76 0.13 2.70
(a) BRITE generated topology, 100 nodes. (b) Rocketfuel topology, AS 4755, 121 nodes.
Figure 6.3. Examples of test topologies.
we can arbitrarily pick these parameters. In the following experiments, the generation
model is set to Waxman, a most commonly used intra-AS model, the node placement
is set to random, and the bandwidth distribution is uniform distribution.
As for the real-world topology, we use Rocketfuel [61], an ISP topology data set
measured by the University of Washington. Each Rocketfuel data le represents a
topology of one AS, ranging from 100 nodes to 10,000 nodes. The data we use does
not include any metric such as bandwidth or latency, so we randomly generate values
for the metrics using a normal distribution.
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Both the generated and the real-world topologies are uni-graphs, i.e., topologies
with only one edge between the same pair of nodes. However, sometimes we need
more than one edge between two nodes, these parallel edges can be either physical
links with dierent metrics, or service oerings on the same link but with dierent
QoS limits. To extend the uni-graphs to multi-graphs, each edge of the uni-graph is
duplicated and assigned with Pareto-optimal metrics.
We use Python to implement our algorithms because of its convenient graph li-
braries, and the ability to integrate into the pox3 SDN controller, which also uses
Python. We use the pypy4 interpreter to run the experiments, which can achieve
performance close to the native code. One exception is the convex sampling in Sec-
tion 6.6, we use CPython for that experiment because the convex hull calculation
uses pyhull, which is not pypy compatible.
The processor we use is an Intel Core2 Quad CPU Q9400 running at 2.66 GHz.
The software conguration is Ubuntu 14.04 64-bit with kernel version 3.13.0-24 and
pypy 2.6.0.
6.5.2 Complexity Analysis
In this section, we provide a theoretical analysis on the plain BFS and ParetoBFS
algorithms (i.e., Algorithms 1 and 3). Let G = (V;E) be the graph, where V =
(v1; v2; :::; vn) is a set of all nodes of the graph and E = (e1; e2; :::; em) is a set of all
edges of the graph. The number of criteria is k. We assume the source node is v1 and
the target node is vn.
Recall that Algorithm 1 rst nds all possible paths and then the Pareto-optimal
paths among all these paths. On the other hand, Algorithm 3 nds the Pareto-optimal
3http://www.noxrepo.org/pox/about-pox/
4A Python interpreter with JIT compiler. http://pypy.org/
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Figure 6.4. The time complexity of ParetoBFS to dierent variables.
path each time when it visits a node. We rst analyze the time to nd all the paths
in Algorithm 1.
As discussed in Section 6.3, a suboptimal path cannot become optimal when a hop
is added to its end. Therefore, all Pareto-optimal paths considered in this paper are
simple paths, which do not have repeating vertices. In a directed graph, for a simple
path, we can order the vertices so that edges only point forward. E.g., if node u is
a descendent of node v, then node u comes after node v in the sorted list of nodes.
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Figure 6.5. The number of Pareto-optimal paths found.
In Algorithm 1, the times that each node vi (i = 1; 2; :::; n) is visited are the number
of the paths from source node v1 to node vi. Let v2 be the next node. The number
of paths from v1 to v2 is the number of parallel edges between them. Let v3 be one
of v2's neighbours, the number of paths from v1 to v3 is the number of (direct) edges
from v1 to v3, plus the paths that use v2 as an intermediate vertex. More generally,
let e(i; j) be the number of directed edges between node vi and node vj (e(i; j) = 0 if
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vi and node vj are not adjacent nodes), and d(j) be the number of paths from v1 to
vj, then we have:
d(j) = e(1; j) +
jX
i=2
d(k)e(k; j):
For each node vj, computing d(j) takes time proportional to the in-degree of node
vj, and overall it will take O(m) time. Therefore, Algorithm 1 visits each node O(m)
times, and the total time to nd all the possible paths in Algorithm 1 is O(nm) time.
To calculate the complexity of the Pareto selection phase, we denote p as the number
of all the paths from source node v1 to target node vn. p could be 1 if there is only
1 simple path from node v1 to node vn, however, p could also be n! when graph G is
full mesh (each node connects to every other node). The operation of Algorithm 2
takes O(k) times computation for each path in the input pareto set. The process of
screening out the Pareto-optimal paths adds 1 Pareto-optimal path each time from
the temporary pareto set, and the number of paths in pareto set goes from 0 to p 1.
Therefore, the process will compute O(k(1 + 2+   + p)) = O(kp2) times. Then, the
running time for Algorithm 1 is O(nm+ kp2).
In contrast to Algorithm 1, Algorithm 3 deletes the non-Pareto-optimal paths from
source node v1 to node vj each time when it visits node vj. Therefore, the number of
paths saved in path queue in Algorithm 3 will be less than that of Algorithm 1. The
number could be the same when all paths are Pareto-optimal. Thus, in the worst case,
Algorithm 3 also visits each node O(m) times. We denote p as the Pareto-optimal
paths between the source node v1 and the target node vn. The total running time for
Algorithm 3 is O(nmkp).
The time complexity of Algorithm 1 is dominated by the number of the paths
p. In fact, in a typical network topology, p usually grows exponentially with the
number of nodes n. We can take the graph in Figure 6.1 as an example. If we have
2 parallel edges between each connecting node pairs, then number of the paths from
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node A to node F becomes 3  23 + 3  24 + 1  25 = 104, which is much larger
than n (n = 6). Besides, the number of the possible paths doubles when a new node
is added into the graph. On the contrary, the time complexity of Algorithm 3 may
not be dominated by the number of the Pareto-optimal paths p when p is just a
small fraction of p. However, the optimal path fraction would grow rapidly when the
number of considered metrics increases. In this case, the time complexity is dominated
by p, and also grows approximate exponentially with n. The experimental results in
the next section indicate the correctness of our analysis here.
6.5.3 Experimental Results
In this section, we present the experimental results of the ParetoBFS algorithm.
We rst present the running time of the plain BFS and ParetoBFS algorithms in
Figure 6.2(b). It shows that the running time of plain BFS increases exponentially
with the increase of the number of nodes. The complexity of ParetoBFS is sub-
exponential, i.e., the running time may grow faster than any polynomial solution but
is still signicantly smaller than an exponential solution. This makes sense because
ParetoBFS's running time grows exponentially with the number of nodes in the worst
case, which happens when the number of the Pareto-optimal paths makes up a large
part of the paths between the source and target node. However, in a realistic network
topology, the Pareto-optimal paths are usually a small fraction of the total paths.
So the pruning method can prevent the curve from going too steep, because it keeps
removing non-Pareto-optimal paths at each node, therefore it avoids unnecessary
comparisons afterwards.
We then present the running time of ParetoBFS to nd all the Pareto-optimal
paths in graphs with dierent parameters. Here, we only focus on the running time.
The memory consumption is proportional to the running time, because it depends
on the length of the path queue. Figure 6.4 shows how the average running time of
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ParetoBFS grows with the increasing number of nodes, parallel edges and criteria,
respectively. Each data point is an average of 30 runs. Figure 6.4(a) shows that
ParetoBFS can nd all the Pareto-optimal paths on a 10,000-node topology in 30
seconds. Figure 6.4(b) shows a similar complexity with the number of parallel edges
as in Figure 6.4(a). This is also reasonable because increasing the number of parallel
edges and increasing the number of nodes have the same eect on the traversal queue
length, and the pruning methods also have similar eects on these two metrics. Fig-
ure 6.4(c), however, shows a steeper growth than the previous gures. For instance, if
there are a number of k metrics w1; w2:::; wk on each edge (the value of wk is generat-
ed randomly), considering two neighboring nodes with two parallel edges connecting
them, the probability that these two edges are Pareto-optimal is 1   1
2k 1 . When k
grows, the number of the Pareto-optimal paths between two nodes approaches the
number of all the paths between them. This is the worst case for ParetoBFS which
makes the running time grows exponentially. The large number of metrics also makes
the Pareto pruning not working eciently, which makes the running time grow faster
than in Figure 6.4(a) and 6.4(b). In order to reduce the running time when the num-
ber of metrics is high, Section 6.6 proposes several sampling methods to reduce the
size of the Pareto-optimal set.
Figure 6.5 shows how the number of the Pareto-optimal paths, p, grows with the
increasing number of nodes, parallel edges and criteria, respectively. In Figure 6.5(a),
the Rocketfuel-topology curve uctuates, because each real topology has unique inte-
rior structure which is not as uniform as the generated topology. In Figure 6.5(b), it
can be observed that the number of the Pareto-optimal paths varies linearly with the
number of parallel edges when there are 2 criteria on each edge. The curves show the
correctness of the analytic O(nmkp) running time for ParetoBFS in the last section
when compared with Figure 6.4(b). When the number of parallel edges doubles, p
and m also double. Therefore, if the curves of p in Figure 6.5(b) can be considered as
53
Algorithm 4 Sampling the Pareto-optimal set after adding a path. The algorithm
is used in place of the pareto add function. The sampling function can be one of the
considered sampling methods.
1: procedure sampling add(pareto set; new path)
2: result set = pareto add(pareto set; new path)
3: if result set:length > th then
4: sampled set = sampling(result set)
5: return sampled set
6: else
7: return result set
8: end if
9: end procedure
linear, the curves are polynomial in Figure 6.4(b). Figure 6.5(c) shows how p varies
with the number of criteria. It can be observed that p increases in Figure 6.5(c) more
than in Figure 6.5(a) and in Figure 6.5(b). As discussed in Section 6.5.2, a large num-
ber of the criteria results in the number of the Pareto-optimal paths approaching the
number of all the paths.
6.6 Sampling Pareto-optimal Paths
ParetoBFS nds all the Pareto-optimal paths. But as the number of criteria
increases, the size of Pareto-optimal set may grow exponentially. Even for a small
1,000-node network with just 3 criteria, there may be hundreds of Pareto-optimal
paths between two nodes.
Sometimes it is not necessary or too slow to nd all the Pareto-optimal paths, so
we introduce a heuristic based on sampling. Sampling the Pareto-optimal set can be
useful in two ways: (1) sampling reduces the diculty of choice for the entity selecting
among Pareto-optimal paths; (2) if sampling happens during the search, the number
of traversed paths can be further reduced, and the algorithm can nd a set of paths
that are close to the Pareto-optimal set in a shorter time.
Algorithm 4 describes how to sample paths. Every time after a path is added to
the Pareto-optimal set, the algorithm checks the Pareto-optimal set size. If the size
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(a) Random sample, th = 10, l = 6.
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(b) clustering sample, th = 10, l = 6.
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(c) Convex sample, th = 10.
Figure 6.6. The eect of dierent sampling methods. (2 criteria, 3 parallel edges,
10,000 nodes)
is larger than a threshold th, a sampling method is used to reduce the Pareto-optimal
set to l paths. It should be noted that sampling can discard some useful path halfway.
It is possible that the nal result is not a subset of the original ParetoBFS result.
Assuming P = fp1; :::; pmg is the Pareto-optimal set found by ParetoBFS, and
Q = fq1; :::; qng is the Pareto-optimal set found by ParetoBFS with sampling. To
compare the eectiveness of the sampling methods, we propose the following metrics:
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 Running Time Ratio (RT) is dened as the ratio of the running time to nd Q
to the running time to nd P . This metric indicates how the sampling method
aects the running time.
 Path Count Ratio (PC) is dened as the ratio of Q's size to P 's size, that
is, PC = n=m. This metric indicates how many Pareto-optimal paths can be
found using this sampling method. It does not indicate the optimality of the
paths.
 Path Quality (PQ) is dened as the average k-dimensional Euclidean distance
between P 's and Q's criteria vector sets wQ = fwq1 ; :::; wqng and wP = fwp1 ; :::;
wpmg. Each wqi or wpi is a Pareto-optimal path's criteria vector. To calculate
PQ, rst normalize wP and wQ into wP 's range:
wpi0j =
wpij  min(wp1j : : : wpmj )
max(wp1j : : : w
pm
j ) min(wp1j : : : wpmj )
; i2f1:::mgj2f1:::kg
wqi0j =
wqij  min(wp1j : : : wpmj )
max(wp1j : : : w
pm
j ) min(wp1j : : : wpmj )
; i2f1:::ngj2f1:::kg
then for each wqi0, calculate the distance from its closest wpt0:
dqi = min
t2f1:::mg
s X
j2f1:::kg
(wqi0j   wpt0j )2
Then PQ can be dened as: PQ = 1
n
Pn
i=1(d
qi). It can be viewed as the average
distance between wP and wQ, PQ = 0 means Q is a subset of P .
The sampling method must be fast and be able to process an arbitrary number
of criteria. Assuming there is no preference over any criterion, the sampling methods
should treat each criterion equally. In this section, three sampling techniques are
investigated: random, clustering, and convex sampling.
56
6.6.1 Random Sampling
This method randomly samples l paths from the Pareto-optimal set. It is fast, but
does not make use of any information of the data points. The result of a 2-criteria
example is shown in Figure 6.6(a). Q mostly overlaps with P , which means that,
after sampling, we can still nd an approximate subset of the Pareto-optimal paths.
6.6.2 Clustering Sampling
It is an intuitive idea to cluster Pareto-optimal points that are close to each other
in the k-dimensional space, especially when looking for redundant paths is not the
goal. Here, we use Lloyd's clustering algorithm [49] to divide the points into l groups,
and select the points closest to the center of each group.
Lloyd's algorithm's time complexity is O(nkli) (n being the number of points; k
being the dimension; l being the number of groups; i being the number of iterations).
The example of a clustering result is shown in Figure 6.6(b). The points are more
dispersed than Figure 6.6(a), thus they are more representative.
6.6.3 Convex Sampling
The assumption of convex sampling is that the points on the convex hull are better
than the ones inside. This can be illustrated by Figure 6.7. Points 1-5 are Pareto-
optimal points. Points 1, 2, 4, 5 and the nadir point (not a real data point) forms the
convex hull. Point 3 is inside the hull. Compared to Point 2, Point 3 only improves
a little in bandwidth, but sacrices a lot in latency. The similar situation applies to
Point 3 and 4. Therefore, Points 2 and 4 seems more preferable than Point 3. This
method works better if the criterion is sum-type, because the points on the convex
hull are more likely to stay optimal when the path is extended.
We use the qhull library, which implements the Quickhull algorithm [10]. Its time
complexity is O(nlogv) in 2-d and 3-d, and O(nv(bd=2c 1)bd=2c ) for higher dimensions (n
being the number of points; v being the number of points on the convex hull). The
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Figure 6.7. Example of convex sampling.
result in Figure 6.6(c) successfully eliminates the points inside the convex hull. For
dimensions higher than 4, the performance of qhull degrades rapidly, it may no longer
help speeding up the algorithm.
The advantage of the convex sampling is that it always reserves the corner points
(e.g. Points 1 and 5 in Figure 6.6(c)), which represent the extreme values in one
dimension, and they are more important if the decision maker wants to choose the
highest value in one dimension. Another advantage is that the calculation of the
convex hull does not require normalizing each dimension, thus improving the speed.
The disadvantage is that the convex sampling cannot control how many points
are sampled. It is possible that too few or too many points are left, which brings
uncertainty to the quality of the sampling result as well as the running time.
6.6.4 Comparison of Sampling Techniques
We test the three sampling techniques on 9 Rocketfuel topologies, whose sizes
range from 121 to 10,152, and get the average RT , PC and PQ. The results are
listed in Table 6.2. The sampling threshold th and sample size l also aect RT , PC
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Table 6.2. The eectiveness of sampling methods.
k th l
random clustering convex
RT PC PQ RT PC PQ RT PC PQ
2 10 5 1.175 0.850 0.141 1.632 0.869 0.004 1.058 0.828 0.001
3 20 10 0.530 0.461 0.022 1.405 0.455 0.026 0.431 0.546 0.007
4 100 10 0.473 0.384 0.030 1.087 0.413 0.032 0.393 0.502 0.030
and PQ. They are chosen from trial runs, to get a compromise between the running
time and the result accuracy.
As for RT , the sampling techniques do not reduce the running speed when k = 2,
but they tend to reduce the running time at higher dimensions. The random and
convex sampling speeds are about the same. The clustering is much slower than the
other two, thus is not recommended. As for PC, all the three techniques can nd a
similar amount of Pareto-optimal paths, even for 4 criteria problems, they can still
nd 40% to 50% of the Pareto-optimal paths. The convex sampling performs slightly
better at higher dimensions. As for PQ, the convex sampling has the best path
quality, but its PQ increases much faster than the other two, this may be because
the convex sampling cannot control the sample size, so the result accuracy is less
adjustable.
Overall, the convex sampling works the best among the three sampling methods,
at least for k = 2; 3; 4. It is faster, nds more Pareto-optimal paths with higher path
quality. Therefore, the convex sampling is recommended when dealing with 2, 3 and
4 criteria topologies.
6.7 Comparison with Related Work
As discussed in Section 6.2, much previous work has addressed the multi-criteria
path nding problem. There are several survey papers and bibliographies [28, 32,
50,64], which summarize more than 40 papers about the multi-criteria shortest path
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Figure 6.8. Running speed of Hansen's algorithm and ParetoBFS. (1 sum-type
metric and 1 bottleneck-type metric, 1 parallel edge, Rocketfuel topology)
problem. Unfortunately, most of the papers only deal with sum-type metrics. Only
two papers { Hansen [36] and Pelegrin et al. [58] { consider one sum-type and one
bottleneck-type metric. Gandibleux et al. have a paper considering one bottleneck-
type and an arbitrary number of sum-type metrics [31]. We have implemented
Hansen's algorithm, and the comparison with ParetoBFS is shown in Figure 6.8.
The Hansen's algorithm examined here is Algorithm 2 in reference [36]. It uses
a multiple labeling scheme. Since Hansen's algorithm nds the exact Pareto-optimal
set, we only compare the running time here.
Figure 6.8 shows the running speed between Hansen's algorithm and ParetoBFS,
we can see that ParetoBFS's running time grows slower with increasing nodes. Even
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for small topologies with a few hundred nodes, ParetoBFS is as fast as Hansen's
algorithm. For the large topology with 10,000 nodes, ParetoBFS is about 40 times
faster than Hansen's algorithm. Not to mention that Hansen's algorithm is only
designed for the bi-criteria problem, while ParetoBFS is capable of dealing with more
criteria.
Other than the exact methods (i.e. to nd all the Pareto-optimal paths) like
ParetoBFS and Hansen's algorithm, many papers propose approximation methods to
nd a subset of Pareto-optimal paths in an ecient manner. These are known as
fully polynomial approximation schemes (FPAS). All the FPAS we investigated are
only for sum-type metrics5. Here, we compare ParetoBFS with a popular FPAS {
Martins' algorithm [51].
Martins' algorithm only gives an approximation of the Pareto-optimal set, which
may dier from the exact Pareto-optimal set. Similarly, we compare the quality of
results as in Section 6.6. The results on 4 Rocketfuel topologies are shown in Table 6.3.
Even for graphs with hundreds of nodes, the running speed of Martins' algorithm
is tens to hundreds times slower than ParetoBFS. On larger Rocketfuel topologies,
Martins' algorithm becomes too slow to be feasible. Though Martins' algorithm nds
a reasonable portion of the Pareto-optimal set (about 40% to 60%) and the quality
of paths is very close to the exact Pareto-optimal set, Martins' algorithm is too slow
compared to ParetoBFS. Besides, ParetoBFS can nd all the Pareto-optimal paths
while Martins' algorithm only nds a part of them.
Table 6.4 compares the complexity of ParetoBFS with Hansen's algorithm and
Martins' algorithm. From the comparison, we can see that ParetoBFS is superior
than prior work in various aspects: It is able to take an arbitrary number of sum-
5In some work (e.g., [48]), it is suggested that bottleneck types can be converted to sum types
by reciprocal. That is, dene the optimal goal as: fp =
P
e
1
bandwidth(e) ; e 2 p, where p is a path and
e is an edge on p.
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Table 6.3. Comparing Martins' with ParetoBFS on 4 Rocketfuel topologies.
# of
nodes
k=2 k=3 k=4
RT PC PQ RT PC PQ RT PC PQ
121 1.1 0.56 0.0000 1.3 0.41 0.0000 1.5 0.44 0.0000
609 23.7 0.42 0.0050 178.7 0.38 0.0018 121.2 0.38 0.0003
855 126.5 0.68 0.0000 233.4 0.61 0.0004 258.9 0.53 0.0007
917 34.4 0.41 0.0074 169.6 0.24 0.0008 279.1 0.37 0.0006
Table 6.4. Comparison of path nding algorithms. (p and p are the numbers of all
the Pareto-optimal and possible paths between two nodes, respectively.)
Type
Number of Number of Pareto-
Complexity
criteria Optimal paths
Plain BFS k p O(mn+ kp2) (p > p)
ParetoBFS k p O(mnkp)
Hasen's [36] 2 p O(p2 log n)
Martins' [51]
k sum-type
! (! < p) O(k2m
n
!2 log!)
metrics
type and bottleneck-type metrics. Besides, it nds the full Pareto-optimal set faster
than other exact methods. Our experiments also show that it is even faster than
certain FPAS in practice.
6.8 Summary
This chapter addresses the problem of nding multiple, mutually Pareto-optimal
paths in a network, where multiple criteria are used for path nding. Such information
is necessary in ChoiceNet, where the marketplace needs to provide path choices to
customers for a posteriori selection.
This chapter describes ParetoBFS, an algorithm to nd all the Pareto-optimal
paths in a network. Experiments show it works well and the algorithm can get a
solution on a typical network in reasonable time. This work also proposes several
sampling techniques to further reduce the running time when nding all the Pareto-
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optimal paths is not necessary or not feasible. Results from both generated and real
topologies has been presented to show that ParetoBFS is practically useful.
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CHAPTER 7
ACCESS CONTROL IN DATA PLANE
In ChoiceNet, an important problem is to make sure only authorized users (i.e.,
those who have paid for a particular network service) can access the service. Most
existing authentication approaches are based on cryptographic techniques. However,
cryptography has high computational cost, making it unsuitable for the data plane
of the network, where potentially every packet needs to be checked at Gigabit per
second link rates. This chapter describes a novel design for data plane access con-
trol, called OrthCredential. The main idea is to use a set of orthogonal sequences
as credentials that can be veried easily to protect the data plane against various
attacks. These orthogonal sequences can be constructed by Hadamard matrices. The
evaluation shows that OrthCredential only requires less than 300 processor cycles for
verication with 64-bit credentials, much less than existing access control schemes
such as HMAC. And it provides reasonable security strength (e.g., less than 10 8
probability of successful attack).
Some of the material in this chapter have been published in [16].
7.1 Introduction
A key technical challenge in ChoiceNet is to provide access control to the network
services. For example, in a source routing based ChoiceNet implementation, the paths
are specied in the packet header. It is possible that a malicious user (i.e. attacker)
can modify the packet header to use paths it should not use. Therefore, it is necessary
to check the packets before they are granted access to certain resources.
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Figure 7.1. Interactions between a user, an attacker and a provider.
Fig. 7.1 illustrates the interactions between a provider, a user and an attacker.
After the provisioning request is sent to the provider, it distributes credentials to the
user and the data plane devices. The user attaches a credential to each packet for
service, which is created via some method (e.g., cryptographic hash) with the secret
information. The data plane devices can validate whether a user (or network trac
sent by the user) is authorized for access by validating the credentials. While potential
attackers always try to extract the credential information from the legitimate packets
and pretend to be the authorized users, the access control scheme should make sure
only the user who sends packets with the valid credentials can access the services.
It is important to note that, the ChoiceNet is potentially a part of the future
Internet with up to billions of users with billions of services. Traditionally, an eective
checking mechanism may only require that authorized packets have some property
that is hard for attackers to duplicate, while easy for legitimate users to create.
However, when considering the common case that millions of packets on a link need
65
to be checked by a router simultaneously, it is critical to develop authentication
methods that can be checked with low performance impact, while providing sucient
protection from access by unauthorized attackers.
This chapter proposes a novel design for data plane credential called OrthCreden-
tial (Orthogonal Credential), which enables access control and can be generated and
veried at high data rates with low processing overhead and low storage requirements.
The main idea of OrthCredential is that the user uses a sequence (credential) which
is orthogonal to the verier's sequences. And the verier checks the inner product of
the user's credential and the sequence on the verier. The result of the inner prod-
uct equals 0 means the credential is valid. These orthogonal sequences can be easily
constructed from Hadamard matrices.
While designing and enriching access control protocols has received much atten-
tion, our focus is on decreasing the cost to satisfy data plane devices' computational
capability while guaranteeing an acceptable level of security. The advantage of Or-
thCredential is in two aspects: 1) the computation of inner product of two binary
sequences can be done by fast integer operations on CPU; 2) the verier only needs
to save a few basic orthogonal credentials and a sum of received valid credentials to
check the validity of multiple received packets. The OrthCredential scheme has low
verication time since inner product computations are much simpler than crypto-
graphic operations. The main advantages of OrthCredential can be summarized as
follows:
Low Verication Time We use an inner product computation to replace compli-
cated cryptographic operations so that the verication time is signicantly de-
creased (less than 350 clock cycles per packet if requiring less than 10 10 prob-
ability for an attacker to guess a valid credential). The speed comparison with
existing access control scheme is shown in Section 7.6.2;
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Fast Verication of Invalid Credential OrthCredential can detect invalid cre-
dentials even faster than valid ones. It can typically be done in a single inner
product computation (less than 50 clock cycles). This eliminates the possibility
of overwhelming the data path devices' computational resource by sending large
volume of invalid packets.
Low Storage Requirement on Router The verier (e.g., a router) only needs to
save a small part of the orthogonal sequences and the sum of received valid
credentials, which leads to very small storage consumption per ow. In Section
7.6, we will show that a space consumption of no more than 0.1 KB on the router
can promise a random attack probability of less than 10 10 while preventing
replay attacks simultaneously.
Small Packet Header OrthCredential header in a packet is small (no more than
28 clock bytes) and thus does not incur signicant overhead in packets in the
data plane of the network.
Section 7.3 provides a statement of the access control problem. Section 7.2 briey
discusses the conventional solutions and their shortcomings. Section 7.4.3 to 7.5 pro-
pose the new credential design, OrthCredential. Section 7.6 presents the evaluation
results and a prototype implementation. Finally, Section 7.7 makes the conclusion.
7.2 Related Work
Most of the existing approaches of such packet checks are a poor match for the
problem of access control to reserved resources while considering the \low cost" re-
quirement, for two reasons. First, most of the authentication mechanisms are based
on cryptographic schemes (e.g., digital signatures, HMAC [46] or UMAC [14] that
uses a hash of the packet contents with a shared secret in it), or traceback schemes
(trace packets to their source by reconstructing the path followed by packets). How-
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ever, these schemes are dicult to use in practice due to expensive encryption com-
putations or a complex process to identify packets, especially when considering the
increasing number of users and services in the future networks. Computation is a
notoriously scarce resource in routers, and thus an attacker could saturate a router's
authentication checking capacity with bogus packets at some point along a ow's
path, eectively denying service without forging valid credentials. An attacker that
repeatedly oods the same packets can be denied by a modestly sized replay cache
in the router. However, a dicult case is if the attacker can amass packets from
many ows within a single validity window (e.g., ICING [55]). Besides, though some
mechanisms (e.g., FPAC [18]) help mitigate the computation cost by encrypting a
short random nonce rather than the payload, the router needs to maintain a receiv-
ing window for acceptable credentials considering that packets sent by users are hard
to always arrive in strictly monotonic order. Therefore, to guarantee most of the valid
packets to be checked by the router, additional memory consumption is required for
each ow, which is possibly prohibitive for a router when supporting millions of ows
simultaneously.
Traditional mechanisms provide a level of security that is very high and ensure
that the probability of an attacker generating a legitimate packet is astronomically
low. Though such high level of security is critical in some scenarios that the end-to-
end acceptance of data that has been forged can be disastrous, it is overkill in the
context of many network services (e.g., bandwidth or buer space), where the goal
is to guarantee low delay and loss probabilities to particular classes of packets. It is
sucient to limit the frequency of accepting a bogus packet to an acceptable level,
which, in the contrary, opens the possibility of low performance impact in verifying
time and space consumption of each router.
68
7.3 Preliminaries
Before the introduction of OrthCredential system, we begin the discussion with
a description of security requirements, attacker capabilities and incapabilities. Then,
we list the performance metrics considered in our system.
7.3.1 Security Requirements
This work only considers the problem of access control after a contract has been
established between a user and a provider. In Fig. 7.1, we assume that the com-
munications in steps 1-2 of the iterations are private and the service credentials (or
credential seeds) can not be observed by a third party. This end-to-end security can
be achieved by using existing protocols (e.g., TLS).
The access control system must have the following security properties to be con-
sidered as a solution to our problem:
Security Strength To provide a secure network infrastructure, it is crucial that
credentials are only available to authorized users in the network. Therefore,
credentials should be dicult to be guessed or faked. Brute force methods
must yield a suciently low probability of success that the packets sent by
authorized users is unaected.
Verication without Trusting Hosts The verier should prevent malicious hosts
spoong packets. Authenticity should be determined solely from the packet
content and static per-ow information (e.g., public key or shared secret), and
not from any other host information that changes per-packet.
Replay Prevention The authentication mechanism should include a method to de-
tect reused credentials. This implies that the used credential information must
be stored on a per-packet basis in a certain form. Given a xed eld size in the
packet, this requirement implies that the number of packets that can be veried
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is bounded; however, it should be large, so that resynchronization is required
infrequently, even for high-data-rate links.
7.3.2 Attacker Capabilities
A malicious user, or an attacker, is trying to grant the access to some services
(by sning packets from authorized users and extracting the credentials from the
packets, or by some other methods). Fig. 7.1 illustrates such attacker's behavior.
Such attack may interfere with authorized packets, making the user failing to get the
guaranteed service. In some scenarios, this may bring lost revenue to the provider.
Our assumptions about the attacker's capabilities can be summarized as the following:
 Ability to eavesdrop at some point along the path from the user to the veri-
er. Sning legitimate packets traveling along the path can be accomplished
by breaking into an end system (non-router) connected to a shared-medium
network somewhere along the path.
 Ability to extract the credential information within the packets and pretend to
be the valid users and transmit the packets under correct formats. The valid
credentials can be derived through long-term observation and analysis of the
credentials in the authorized packets.
 Ability to send arbitrary packets or ood a particular link, router, or host to
which it connects, e.g., Denial of Attacks (DoS). By breaking into and taking
control of many end systems within the network, and making them to transmit
bursts of packets addressed to some target simultaneously, the attacker can
cause packets arriving a verier at a rate close to the capacity of the channel.
Additionally, we constrain the capabilities of the attacker as follows:
 An attacker does not have access to the secret capabilities materials associated
with the credential information between users and providers. As discussed ear-
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lier, we assume that the delivery of the secret capabilities materials is through
strict encryption.
 An attacker cannot stop the legitimate packets along the path (i.e., cannot drop
the network trac on a router);
 If an attacker transmits a modied copy of an authorized packet, the packet
cannot arrive before the original one.
It is conceivable that the above assumptions might be violated, which OrthCre-
dential system does not defend against. However, the limitations on the attacker's
capabilities are necessary to keep the discussion of attack scenarios and security re-
quirements within scope.
7.3.3 Performance Metrics
Our model of verier processing implies some performance constraints on the
authentication check. We assume that authentication can be pipelined with other
operations, and consider only requirements that follow from the basic architecture of
the verier (e.g., router). The performance constraints on the verication process are
summarized as the following:
Verication time the time spent on verication of an arriving packet is vital for the
verier. Since credentials need to be validated for every packet that arrives in
a verier, they must be veried with low computational requirements. Further-
more, dierent credential system may perform dierently on the verifying time
for an invalid credential and valid credential. The second one is also important
for the verier, since there may be oods of DoS attacks within the network.
Successful attack probability the probability of the attacker to successfully send
a packet with random or duplicated credentials. This probability should be low
enough to ensure the attacker can only successfully send one packet after a long
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time trying. For example, if the probability is 10 9, the attacker will need about
an hour to send one fake packet on a 1M pkt/s link. We can consider this safe
enough because in reality, the credentials may have changed many times during
an hour.
Storage consumption the storage consumption for the credentials is also crucial
for the veriers, since there are maybe millions of users who have the access
to the same service. Moreover, packets may arrive the verier out-of-order.
Verication mechanisms need to allow arbitrary packet order and save related
information within a reserved window.
7.4 Overview of OrthCredential
In this section, we describe OrthCredential system in a high level, deferring the
design details to Section 7.5.
7.4.1 Goals and Non Goals
OrthCredential is an authentication system intended for use in authorizing access
control to reserved network resources to address the requirements in Section 7.3.1.
OrthCredential is dierent from conventional MACs that use cryptographic al-
gorithms. It uses orthogonal sequences as credentials and determine validity by ob-
serving whether their inner product equals 0. The probability of counterfeiting it
is higher than other crypt-schemes, but it is still low enough to be safe. The goal
of OrthCredential is to achieve high performance and low cost for verication by e-
liminating some security guarantees that we have discussed above. It needs to be
emphasized that OrthCredential is not designed as a replacement of conventional
MAC algorithms. We believe many MAC schemes perform very well in end-to-end
data transmission for high security demands, but it cannot meet the requirements in
a general service-oriented network with billions of services and users.
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Table 7.1. A full description of the relevant notations.
Variables Description
seed The secret information sent to the user and the verier by the provider.
n Length of each credential.
k The index of generated Hadamard matrices (k = 1; 2; 3:::).
H(k) The kth orthogonal matrix generated by user (k = 1; 2; 3:::).
hi(k) The i
th row of H(k) (1 6 i 6 n).
ri(k) The random vector corresponding to hi(k).
key(k) A secret key corresponding to H(k) which is used to generate ri(k).
ci(k) The i
th credential and it satises ci(k) = hi(k) + ri(k)
m The number of the saved rows of H(k) in the verier (1 6 m 6 n).
Hm(k) A number of m rows in H(k) that saved in the verier (router).
hm;i(k) The i
th row of Hm(k) in the verier (1 6 i 6 m).
c The credential extracted from received packets by verier.
h The vector computed from c and it is expected to satisfy h = c   ri for
some i.
counter(k) The newest number of the credentials veried as valid, the value of couter
resets when k is updated.
sum(k) The sum vector of vi(k) which is saved in the verier and sum(k) =Pn
i=1 vi(k), the initial value of sum(k) = 0.
sum bit[i] sum bit[i] saves the ith bit of each entry of sum(k) (1 6 i 6 log2 n+ 1).
There are several functions that OrthCredential is not designed for: (i) OrthCre-
dential does not guarantee the security and integrity of the payload in the packet
during the packet's forwarding; (ii) OrthCredential does not guarantee the security
of the path that the packet goes on. Actually, a secure path between two nodes can
be also seemed as a service and OrthCredential can only provide the access to these
secure paths which are set up by provides.
7.4.2 Deployment Scenario
The ideal deployment scenario for OrthCredential is at the network layer. Consider
a path service with given bandwidth guarantees as an example: The providers would
deploy OrthCredential routers at the ingress of their networks (i.e., edge routers). As
shown in Fig. 7.1, after the user established a contract with a provider, the provider
sets up the service and sends a secret generating seed to both the user and the edge
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Figure 7.2. Credentials generation and verication in OrthCredential system.
routers along the transmission path. Each time the user uses the path service of
the provider, the user sends packets with a credential generated by the secret seed.
The edge router of the provider only forwards packets that contain a valid credential.
Therefore, only an authorized user can access the bandwidth provided in the path
service. The generation and verication mechanism of a credential is discussed further
in Section 7.5.
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7.4.3 Architecture and Components
OrthCredential is based on the technique of generating a series of sequences with
mutual-orthogonal properties known to the user and the verier. After a user has
pursued some service from a provider, the provider will set up the service and send a
secret generating seed to both the user and the devices along the transmission path.
The seed contains the secret information of generating dierent n  n orthogonal
matrices H(k) (k is a numerical order). Besides, the seed also contains the corre-
sponding keys (denoted as key(k)) for each H(k). Each time when a packet is sent,
the user chooses the rst unused row vector hi(k) from H(k) (i is the index of rows
in H(k)) and generates a random vector ri(k) by using key(k), then the user can get
a credential by:
ci(k) = hi(k) + ri(k); where k = 1; 2; 3; :::
A similar process is in the verier: the verier will generate Hm(k) which includes a
number of m rows of H(k), and save it in memory. Once all rows from H(k) are run
out of, H(k+1) will be generated from the seed. For every packet arriving at routers,
the router extracts credential c and subtracts the corresponding ri(k) and results h.
Then, h is used to compute the inner product with each hm;i(k), row vector of Hm(k)
(81 6 i 6 m), to check its validity. Finally, to prevent replay attacks, h will be
used to compute the inner product with sum(k), the saved sum of the received valid
orthogonal credentials, to check if c has been used or not, since a used credential
will result in a non-zero inner product. If c is veried as valid, then the router
will add h into sum(k) to prevent replay attacks with credential c. Fig. 7.2 shows
the entire process that OrthCredential works, where the details will be discussed in
Section 7.5. The concise denitions of the notations we used in this paper can be
found in Table 7.1.
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Figure 7.3. An illustration of Hadamard matrix and its property. (a) is an 8  8
Hadamard matrix, in (b) it reverses the sign of its fth and sixth column and in (c) it
swaps the third and seventh row. After all these transform operations, the matrices
in (b) and (c) are still Hadamard matrices.
The security of OrthCredential is based on a very low probability of an attacker
to obtain a credential satisfying that the results of its inner product with each hm;i(k)
and sum(k) equal 0 simultaneously. Even for a replay packet, the result of the inner
product of h (h = c  ri(k)) and sum(k) equals jjh2jj but not 0 either.
In our OrthCredential system, these orthogonal matrices H(k) are Hadamard ma-
trices. In the next section, we will introduce the Hadamard matrix and its important
properties which are used in OrthCredential.
7.4.4 Hadamard Matrix
7.4.4.1 Denition
A Hadamard matrix is an n  n matrix H containing entries from the set Z2 =
f 1; 1g, with the property of HHT = nIn.
This equation implies that all distinct rows or columns of a Hadamard matrix are
linearly independent. Therefore, all rows or columns of a Hadamard matrix H are
mutually orthogonal, i.e., have an inner product of 0. It needs to note that, in this
chapter, all the computations are in the vector space, and each credential is viewed as
76
a vector. Let (v1; v2) denote the inner multiple computation, then vectors v1 and v2
are orthogonal if and only if (v1; v2) = 0. For instance, v1 = ( 1; 1; 1) is orthogonal
to v2 = ( 1; 1; 0) because (v1; v2) = ( 1)  ( 1) + ( 1)  1 + 1  0 = 0. In this
chapter, we use an \entry" to denote an element in a vector, for instance, each entry
in a row of a Hadamard matrix is 1 or -1.
An illustration of a Hadamard matrix is Fig. 7.3(a). In our OrthCredential system,
we use 0 represent -1 in the Hadamard matrix. Then, the verication of checking
whether the result of (c1; c2) equals 0 can be simply achieved by checking whether
the number of `0's equals the number of `1's in the result of bitwise AND operation
c1&c2.
7.4.4.2 Properties
It is proved that, an n n Hadamard matrix exists for n = 1, n = 2, and n = 4k
for any k 2 N [41]. We further introduce a basic, but very important, property of
Hadamard matrix:
Theorem 1 There are several operations on Hadamard matrices that preserve its
property: (i) Swapping rows, and changing the sign of rows; (ii) Swapping columns,
and changing the sign of columns; (iii) Transposition.
An illustration of the property is shown in Fig. 7.3: Fig. 7.3(a) illustrates an 88
Hadamard matrix; in Fig. 7.3(b), we change the sign of its fth and sixth column; in
Fig. 7.3(c), we further swap the third and seventh row. After these operations, the
transformed matrices are still Hadamard matrices. Strictly speaking, two Hadamard
matrices H, H 0 are said to be dierent if H 0 cannot be produced from H by these
transform operations (i)-(iii). Therefore, there is only one 2  2 Hadamard matrix,
though it has eight dierent expressions. Reference [41] has enumerated the number of
inequivalent classes of Hadamard matrices from n = 2 to n = 32, for n = 32, there are
13,707,126 matrices. When n is bigger than 32, the numbers of dierent Hadamard
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matrices are even much larger. This ensures generation of a random Hadamard matrix
that the attacker cannot guess easily, which also limit the possibility of forging it.
Even if the attacker can guess one credential brute-forcely, it will expire when the
next Hadamard matrix is generated.
7.5 Design details of OrthCredential
This section details OrthCredential's design, which aims to meet the requirements
stated in Section 7.3.
Table 7.1 describes the notation what we use throughout our design discussion and
our pseudo code, and Fig. 7.4 shows the OrthCredential header format. The header
includes two types of information for each user. The rst is the user's information,
the provider will assign a unique ID for each user who has established a contract
with. The verier will turn to the corresponding verifying materials by checking this
ID information. The second is the information used for verication: fn, i, k, ci(k)g.
The length of ci(k) (i.e., n) in our current system is 32, 64 or 128 bits. The verier
will tell the dierence by checking n or the \header length" part.
In total, the overhead of the OrthCredential header in a packet is 16 to 28 bytes.
The credentials part could be 32, 64 or 128 bits. header length and credential length
are in bytes. The original IP protocol is encapsulated in the OrthCredential payload.
7.5.1 Creating Credentials
As described in Section 7.4.3, a credential ci(k) is given by ci(k) = hi(k) + ri(k).
We generate ri(k) by using a random() function with the seed (key(k); k; i). Each ri(k)
is dierent due to dierent sets of (key(k); k; i). The reason why we add ri(k) with
hi(k) in OrthCredential system is, if hi(k) can be easily observed by an attacker, the
attacker can get a valid credential by generating lots of sequences that are orthogonal
to hi(k). Therefore, ri(k) can help decrease the probability for attackers to forge a
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TCP/UDP/ICMP header
protocol
matrix index
user ID
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Figure 7.4. OrthCredential header.
valid credential. We next describe how to construct a Hadamard matrix and thus get
hi(k).
People have derived many construction methods to generate a Hadamard matrix
for a given n [4]. The Hadamard construction method in our system is a simple, but
ecient one - Kronecker Product Construction: if S, T are matrices, their Kronecker
Product S 
 T is the matrix U constructed by replacing each Si;j in S by Si;jT . It
can be proved that the Kronecker Product Hn 
Hm is a Hadamard matrix of order
nm if Hn, Hm are Hadamard matrices of orders n and m. This implies that we can
get a 2n
 2n Hadamard matrix by the product of an n n Hadamard matrix with
the basic 2 2 Hadamard matrix of
0B@ +1 +1
+1  1
1CA :
Before doing Kronecker Product operation, the original n n and the basic 2 2
Hadamard matrices will take several transform operations in Theorem 1 rst, respec-
tively. Then, the generated Hadamard matrix will also take several transform opera-
tions. All these transform operations are described in seed sent by the provider. For
the original n n Hadamard matrix, we use a Walsh-Hadamard transform to get it.
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Algorithm 5 Generating a credential
1: if i%(n+ 1) = 0 then
2: k k + 1, i  1
3: key(k)  seed(k):key
4: H1  Hadamard Transform(n2 )
5: H2  Hadamard Transform(2)
6: H1, H2  Transform Operation(H1, H2, seed(k))
7: H(k)  Kronecker Product(H1, H2)
8: H(k)  Transform Operation(H(k), seed(k))
9: hi(k)  the ith row of H(k)
10: ri(k)  Random(key(k), k, i)
11: ci(k)  hi(k) + ri(k)
12: return (ci(k), k, i)
For instance, in Fig. 7.3(a), if we let the bottom row as 0th row and the leftmost colum-
n as the 0th column, then its (i; j)th entry Hi;j can be written as Hi;j = ( 1)
Pn
p=1(ipjp),
where i =
Pn
p=1 ip2
p and j =
Pn
p=1 jp2
p. The Walsh-Hadamard transform is easy to
implement, since the computation of
Pn
p=1(ip  jp) can be simply achieved by checking
the number of `1's in the result of the bitwise operation i AND j. In real implemen-
tations, the verier will save a number of basic Hadamard matrices beforehand, since
they may be used for each ow's verication. In Section 7.6.1, we will show that this
generation method can guarantee a very low repeating probability.
Each time when a packet is sent, the user chooses an unused row vector ci(k) as
the credential and places it together with its index k; i in the packet. Once all rows
from H(k) are run out of, H(k+1) will be generated from the secret seed. We design
the maximum k is 100, and the user will ask for a new seed from the provider when
k is out. Each n-bit credential ci(k) (ci(k) = hi(k) + ri(k)) satises the following
equations:
8>><>>:
 
hi(k); hj(k)

= 0; when i 6= j; 
hi(k); hj(k)
 6= 0; when i = j: (7.1)
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Algorithm 6 Verifying a credential
1: ri(k)  Random(key(k), k, i)
2: h  c  ri(k)
3:
B Step 1: Verify h = hm;i(k) or (h; hm;i(k)) = 0
4: for 1 6 i 6 m do
5: if h = hm;i(k) then
6: break
7: else
8: result  number of 1s in (h hm;i(k))
9: if result 6= n=2 then
10: return InValid
11:
B Step 2: Verify (h; sum(k)) = 0
12: result  0
13: number h0  number of 0s in h
14: number h1  number of 1s in h
15: for 1 6 i 6 log2 n+ 1 do
16: number0  number of `0's in (h & sum bit[i])
17: number1  number of `1's in (h & sum bit[i])
18: result  result+ 2i 1(number1   number0)
19: if result 6= couter(k)  (number h1   number h0) then
20: return InValid
21:
B Step 3: Update sum(k)
22: for 2 6 i 6 log2 n+ 1 do
23: if i = 2 then
24: carry  h
25: else
26: temp carry  sum bit[i]
27: carry  carry & sum bit[i]
28: sum bit[i] temp
29: couter(k) couter(k) + 1;
30: return Valid
7.5.2 Verifying Credentials
The verier only generates and saves a number of m rows of H(k) (i.e., Hm(k)),
not the whole matrix. In real implementations, m is usually 10%   30% of n. The
value of m depends on the security requirements of the service, and if the verier
saves the whole H(k) (i.e., m = n) then it can achieve the best protection against
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forgery attacks. In Section 7.6, we will show that even a small m can also provide a
very good protection for the access to the service.
For each packet arriving at provider devices, the verier extracts credential c, then
subtracts the corresponding row ri and nally gets h. Then, h is used to compare
with or compute the inner product with hm;i(k) to verify the validity of c. To avoid
replay attacks, h will also be used to compute the inner product with sum(k) to
check if c has been used or not, since a used credential will result in a non-zero inner
product. A received credential c is veried as valid when the following conditions are
satised:
1. 9 i (1 6 i 6 m); h = hm;i(k) or
8 i (1 6 i 6 m);  h; hm;i(k) = 0; (7.2)
2.
 
h; sum(k)

= 0: (7.3)
If h satises the above equations (i.e., c is a valid credential), the local variable
couter(k) will plus 1. Here, couter(k) implies that h is the (couter(k))th valid creden-
tial received by the verier. In order to protect against a replay attack with credential
c, the verier will add h with sum(k) and save the result as a new sum(k). It must be
emphasized that: (i) the addition here is between two vectors not two numbers; (ii)
though we use 0 represent  1 in h during verication (as described in Section 7.4.4),
but during this addition operation, h should be the original vector with entries 1 or
 1. Thus, the value of each entry of sum(k) is an integer in the range of [ n; n]. We
next explain the verication details during real implementations:
Step 1: Verify Equation (7.2). The operations of verifying whether the result
of (h; hm;i(k)) equals 0 can be simply achieved, which is through checking whether
the number of `0's equals the number of `1's in the result of bitwise operation h AND
hm;i(k).
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Step 2: Verify Equation (7.3). The cost of the verication process mainly
depends on the operations between h and sum(k) when m is small. An intuitive
solution would be represent sum(k) as an array with n integers which are in the
range of [ n; n], and use n iterations to calculate the inner product. However, we
can use the following schemes to decrease the cost to O(log2n):
 Remove negatives in sum(k): during the addition operation between h and
sum(k), we update sum(k) with the result of sum(k) + h + en, where en =
(111:::11)n. Therefore, the value range of each entry in sum(k) becomes [0; 2n].
 Recompose sum(k): we use a set of fsum bit[i]g to represent sum(k), where
1 6 i 6 log2 n+ 1. Each sum bit[i] is an n-bit local variable in the verier and
the jth bit of sum bit[i] denotes the ith bit of the jth entry of sum(k). Fig. 7.5
is an example which shows the relations between sum(k) and sum bit[i] when
n = 32. From the above discussion, we know that, each time sum(k) updates
by adding the result of h + en whose each entry is 2 or 0, therefore each entry
of sum bit[1] is always 0. In real implementations, the verier does not save
sum bit[1] to decrease the storage consumption.
By the above schemes, Equation (7.3) could be written as:
couter(k)  (h; en) =
Xlog2n+1
i=1
2i 1  (h; sum bit[i]):
The computations of inner product in the above equation can be realized by simple
bitwise operations as the same as computing (h; hm;i(k)). Therefore, we reduce the
processing time of verifying Equation (7.3) from O(n) to O(log2 n).
Step 3: Update sum(k). An intuitive solution of updating sum(k) with the
result of sum(k) + h would also need n iterations to accumulate the sum of each
entry in sum(k) and the corresponding entry (1 or  1) in h. However, with the
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Figure 7.5. Bitwise calculation of sum(k).
above representation of sum bits, we can also decease the processing time of updating
sum(k) from O(n) to O(log2 n). As described above, we actually update sum(k) with
sum(k) + h + en, where each entry of the result of h + en is 2 or 0. Therefore, in
real implementations, we will let each entry of sum bit[2] plus 1 if the corresponding
entry of this result is 2. If the addition on an entry of sum bit[2] produces a carry,
then reset this entry and transmit a carry to the corresponding entry of sum bit[3],
and so forth.
In addition to the verifying operations in Step 1, the whole verifying time (count
in clock cycles) is in a scale of O(m + log2 n). In Section 7.6, we will present the
running time under real implementations. The pseudo codes of these algorithms for
generation and verication of a credential are shown in Algorithm 5-6.
7.5.3 Attacks
The security of OrthCredential is based on a very low probability of an attacker to
obtain credentials that satises Equations (7.2) and (7.3) simultaneously. We briey
analyze how OrthCredential counters various threats.
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An attacker may try to obtain credentials by brute force. We use a part
of n mutually orthogonal vectors (i.e., Hm(k)) to make these \grope around" attacks
impossible. Though the probability that a random vector is (with entries \-1" or
\1") orthogonal to hm;i(k) cannot be concluded theoretically, we verify the very low
probability for random successful attack by experiments. In our implementation of
OrthCredential system, this random attack successful probability would be even lower
because a valid credential also has to be orthogonal with sum(k). The results of the
experiments are shown in Section 7.6.
An attacker may try to obtain credentials by replaying the valid creden-
tials sent by the user. We use a sum(k) to perfectly prevent this kind of attack.
It works since once h is veried to be valid, then it will be added into sum(k). Thus,
we have (h; sum(k)) = (h; h) = jhj2 6= 0. If h is expired for k, h will be also veried
to be invalid due to a very low probability that h is orthogonal to each new hm;i(k).
An attacker may try to obtain credentials by generating Hadamard
matrices. OrthCredential provides double protection against this attack. First, as
discussed in Section 7.5.1, the properties of Hadamard matrices guarantee a very low
probability that an attacker generates the same matrix as the user's. Besides, we use
a dynamic random vector ri(k) to \encrypt" each row of the generated Hadamard
matrix. If the attacker obtains the information of some ri(k) of a user, the attacker
can derive hi(k) by observing the packets sent by the user, it is still very far away
from breaking through the verier. This is because hi(k) cannot be used directly, the
attacker needs to generate vectors that are orthogonal to hi(k). However, it is still a
very low probability that these generated vectors are orthogonal with all the hm;i(k)
in the verier.
An attacker may eavesdrop the communications between the user and
the provider. Each time when the credentials generated from seed are run out of,
the user will ask its service provider for a new credential seed. In OrthCredential
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system, any end-to-end trac between the user and provider will be encrypted using
existing protocols (e.g., TLS/SSL). There is no way for an attacker to obtain secret
information by this behavior.
There are also other attacks described in Section 7.3.2 that are out of our as-
sumption of the attackers' incapabilities and OrthCredential cannot defend against.
Actually, it's a future work we will consider in OrthCredential.
7.6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of security, verication time and
storage consumptions in OrthCredential. We have implemented the algorithm in
C++. We use a PC with an Intel Core2 Quad CPU Q9400 running at 2.66GHz to
test the algorithm's performance. The operating system is Ubuntu 14.04 64-bit with
kernel version 3.13.0-24 and gcc version 4.8.2. Both the credential generation and
verication codes are compiled in one program with gcc -O3 optimize level. We do
not use platform specic instructions or assembly codes. The time consumed by each
step is measured by CPU clock cycles.
7.6.1 Security
We rst run simulations to ensure a very low probability of generating the same
Hadamard matrix by the construction method which is described in Section 7.5.1.
During the generating process, we take 3 basic transform operations each time (per-
mutation, changing signs or transposition). We generate 100; 000 Hadamard matrices
for n = 32, 64 and 128 and nd the number of the same generated Hadamard matri-
ces among them. The repeatability result is that, when n = 32, the repeatability is
0:18% and it is nearly 0 when n = 64 or 128. Considering that a dynamic random
vector ri(k) will also \encrypt" each row of the Hadamard matrix, we believe that it
is impossible for an attacker to guess a valid credential.
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We then simulate a scenario that an attacker sends random credentials to brute
force the verication process. As discussed in Section 7.5.2, the rst step of verifying
a valid credential is to determine whether this credential is orthogonal with each
hm;i(k) while a random credential is hard to achieve this. Fig. 7.6 shows the success
probability of such random attack. It can be observed that, when the credential
length (i.e., n) is 128, m > 10 can guarantee the breakthrough probability less than
10 9, which can be considered safe enough. For some services with low-security
requirements, we consider 32-bit or 64-bit credentials can also be used with a proper
chosen m.
We also simulate a scenario that an attacker sends replay packets, the result is
that all these replay packets are discarded by the verier no matter what n and m
are. There are also other attacks in reality that we cannot simulate, the discussions
can be found in Section 7.5.3.
7.6.2 Verication Time
In OrthCredential system, we use computations of inner product to replace compli-
cated cryptographic operations so that the verication time is signicantly decreased,
most of the possible computations are simplied to use the basic bitwise operations.
We have tested the dierent credential length (i.e., n) and dierent number of
rows of a Hadamard matrix stored on the verier (i.e., m). Fig. 7.8(a) shows the
time needed to verify a valid credential. When m is relatively smaller than n, the
time increases almost linearly with m. That is because, in this case, the probability
that h (calculated from the received credential c) equals a saved hm;i(k) is relatively
small, thus a valid user's credential has to be calculated against all the m rows of
Hm(k) to get veried. When m approaches n, the verier has a larger probability
of saving an hm;i(k) that equals h, which makes the verication process jump to the
sum verication, therefore the curve becomes gradual.
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Figure 7.6. Successful attack probability of random generated credentials.
As discussed in Section 7.5.2, it requires three steps to verify a valid credential,
which runs in a scale of O(m + log2 n) time. The main cost depends on Step 1 and
Step 2 since they both need an operation to count the number of `1's or `0's in a
vector (i.e., POPCOUNT operation), while Step 3 only does the basic AND or XOR
bitwise operations. 16-bit POPCOUNT is done by looking up twice in a 8-bit lookup
table, while 32 and 64-bit POPCOUNT uses a variable-precision SWAR algorithm
introduced in [2]. Because the lookup table method is faster, we can see the time
for n = 16 is almost half of the time when n = 32. 32-bit and 64-bit credential cost
almost the same time, because for a 64-bit CPU, operating a 64-bit integer is as fast as
a 32-bit integer. 128-bit credential needs twice the time of 64-bit credential, because
the CPU cannot do 128-bit integer calculation natively, all the calculations must be
performed as two 64-bit operations. It is worth noting that although some new Intel
x86 CPUs have SSSE3 and SSE4.2 instructions that can do fast POPCOUNT [37],
we do not use it because OrthCredential system is platform dependent. If we use it,
the speed can be further improved.
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Figure 7.7. Number of inner product computations to identify invalid packets.
Fig. 7.8(b) shows the average time needed to verify a random attack credential.
Theoretically, the verier can discard the invalid credential within the rst few inner
product computations in Step 1 due to the low random attack successful probability.
Therefore, the time is much less compared to verify a valid credential, and it is also
nearly irrelevant to m. When n = 16, it takes a longer time to verify a random
credential, this is due to the higher random attack successful probability, which will
lead to a longer verication process. Fig. 7.7 shows the probability distribution of the
number of the inner product computations required for a random credential before
it is discarded by the verier. When the number is larger than 10, the probability is
nearly zero.
Fig. 7.8(c) shows that the replay attack credentials take almost the same veri-
cation time as a valid credential, albeit none of them will be veried to be a valid
one. This is because a replay credential will not be identied until completing Step 2
{ inner product computation with sum(k). While Step 3 only does serval basic AND
or XOR bitwise operations that require less than 10 clock cycles to proceed, the error
of experiments can cover up this slight dierence between Fig. 7.8(a) and Fig. 7.8(c).
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Conventional cryptographic schemes will take much more verication time. Ta-
ble 7.2 shows the experiment results of the average per-packet verication cost for
some classical conventional cryptographic algorithms for 500-byte packets (an average
packet length in Internet). These algorithms are also implemented in C++ without
platform specic instructions and assembly codes. To make more comparisons, we
also list the cost of some path verication mechanisms (ICING [55], TVA [75] and
DPCP [68]) in the table. By comparing Table 7.2 with Fig. 7.8, we can see the enor-
mous advantages on the verication speed, especially considering the case that a DOS
attacker oods a path with lots of random attack packets (the verication time of the
schemes in Table 7.2 does not change for random attack packets).
7.6.3 Storage Consumption
As illustrated in Fig. 7.4, the total overhead of OrthCredential header in a packet
is 16 to 28 bytes. In OrthCredential, the storage consumption of the verier for each
user depends on two parts: a number of m rows of an n  n Hadamard matrix and
a set of fsum bit[i]g where 2 6 i 6 log2 n+ 1. Thus, the whole storage consumption
in the verier is mn + n log2 n bits. It must be noted that this storage consumption
is under a consideration of preventing replay packets. Many authentication schemes
(e.g., HMAC/UMAC, ICING) cannot provide anti-replay protection naturally and
have to keep a window to save received authorized credentials. In this point of view,
our OrthCredential does not need to save all the newest authenticated credentials,
but uses a sum of the received authenticated credentials instead, which decreases the
storage consumption eciently. For instance, if OrthCredential uses 64-bit credentials
with 5 rows of a 64 64 Hadamard matrix to implement verication, then the router
only requires a space of 80 bytes to prevent all possible replay packets while other
conventional cryptographic schemes may need a space of 512 bytes to achieve it.
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(a) A valid credential.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Number of saved rows on verifier (m)
CP
U 
clo
ck
 c
yc
le
s
 
 
n=16
n=32
n=64
n=128
(b) A random attack credential.
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(c) A replay attack credential.
Figure 7.8. Verication time of dierent types of packets. (measured in CPU clock
cycles)
Table 7.2. Average verication costs of dierent access control schemes. (assuming
500-byte packets).
Algorithm Cycles/Packet
HMAC (MD5) 5,335
HMAC (SHA-1) 8,931
AES/CTR (128 bit key) 7,277
DMAC (AES) 12,223
ICING (x-hop) 2,080x + 19,520
TVA (x-hop) 3,264x
DPCP (512-bit credential) 34,780
91
7.7 Conclusions
This chapter introduces a novel credential design to provide ecient access control
in the data plane of a network. A new credential design, OrthCredential, is presented
to solve the problem of protecting reserved services with very low overhead in terms of
verication time and memory consumption, while guaranteeing good security perfor-
mance. The prototype implementation has shown a small credential header (e.g., 20
bytes) can be checked in less than 300 processor cycles and require less than 800 bits
of memory per ow on a router. We believe that OrthCredential will be an important
part of the ChoiceNet.
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CHAPTER 8
DEPLOYMENT ON GENI
GENI (Global Environment for Network Innovations) [13] is a testbed for network-
ing and distributed systems research. It allows experimenters to allocate resources
such as virtual machines and links all over the world. It is well suited for networking
experiments at scale.
To demonstrate the ChoiceNet implementation described in this work, it is de-
ployed on ExoGENI [8]. In this implementation, we use pox1 as the SDN controller,
and install OpenvSwitch2 on GENI nodes to use them as SDN switches. The SDN
protocol is OpenFlow 1.0. The hosts are running 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04.
The test topology is shown as Figure 8.1, which is similar to Figure 6.1. There are
two ASes, one is located at GENI Project Oce (GPO) in Massachusetts, the other is
at University of Florida (UFL). The clients are in the UFL domain, and the server is
in the GPO domain. There are three inter-AS links, each has a dierent bandwidth,
latency and price. The intra-AS links also have dierent metrics. The bandwidth is
hard-coded in the topology when it is created. The latency is measured from ping
tests after the topology is created. The price is set according to the bandwidth and
latency value.
The inter-AS and intra-AS links form 13 paths between the clients and the server.
But only 3 paths are Pareto-optimal. Therefore, the marketplace should return the
following three paths to users:
1http://www.noxrepo.org/pox/about-pox/
2http://openvswitch.org/
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Figure 8.1. GENI test topology.
1. p1=(s1, s2, s4, s6), bandwidth: 1 Mbps; latency: 37 ms; price: $0.06/min;
2. p2=(s1, s2, s5, s6), bandwidth: 3 Mbps; latency: 37 ms; price: $0.07/min;
3. p3=(s1, s2, s5, s4, s6), bandwidth: 6 Mbps; latency: 38 ms; price: $0.15/min.
In this experiment setup, when the ChoiceNet App needs to make choices from
multiple paths, it reads the preference from a conguration le, then automatical-
ly submit the choice to the marketplace. This eliminate the delay of human selec-
tion. There are two pre-dened preferences: lowest_price and highest_bandwidth.
The ChoiceNet App is capable of making more exible decisions such as \highest
bandwidth-price ratio when price <$0.1/min" or \lowest price when bandwidth >3
Mbps", but we do not show these complicated preferences in this experiment.
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In the following sections, we will show how the user preference can aect the
nal user experience. We will also show the quantitative result collected from the
experiments.
8.1 Video Streaming Test
To demonstrate that the hybrid architecture described in Section 5.3 is feasible,
we choose Youtube3 as the example application. To be specic, h1 is congured
as an HTTP proxy, h2 uses VLC player4 to stream Youtube video with http proxy
congured as h1. So the video data will be transmitted to h1 rst, then transmitted
to h2 through one of the three Pareto-optimal paths described above.
In this experiment, the video will not be displayed on the screen, because we are
controlling the hosts over terminals remotely. But the quality of video can be reered
from its bitrate. The higher the bitrate is, the better video quality the user will
experience. Youtube has an adaptive approach for serving videos: it will measure the
link speed rst, then serves videos with similar bitrate.
Figure 8.2 shows the streaming result. The user preference is lowest_price.
The output of ChoiceNet App shows the 1 Mbps path is selected (p1 in Figure 8.1).
The demux bitrate shown in Figure 8.2(a) is around 1 Mbps, meaning the use plane
has correctly provisioned the path. Figure 8.3 shows the streaming result when the
user preference is set to highest_bandwidth. The 6 Mbps path is selected (p3 in
Figure 8.1). The demux bitrate is around 4.5 Mbps (it is not reaching 6 Mbps
because of the limitation of the connection between Youtube and h1).
This test scenario demonstrates that this implementation is capable of performing
a full service listing and service transaction, thus provides more choices to the user.
3http://www.youtube.com/
4http://www.videolan.org/
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(a) VLC player statistics. (b) ChoiceNet App output.
Figure 8.2. Streaming result for lowest price.
(a) VLC player statistics. (b) ChoiceNet App output.
Figure 8.3. Streaming result for highest bandwidth.
It also shows that ChoiceNet can be used to get services from the public Internet,
even if ChoiceNet is only deployed on a local area network.
We have done another experiment to illustrate the \Vote With Your Wallet"
principle described in Section 1.2. By changing the user preference while the video
is playing, the user can observe the video quality changing with user's selection.
To achieve this, we use a new video streaming technique named DASH (Dynamic
Adaptive Streaming over HTTP) [62] instead of Youtube. It is an adaptive bitrate
streaming technique, which will change the video bitrate according to the down-
load speed of the previous video segments. The video server is hosted on h1. The
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Figure 8.4. Demonstration of \Vote With Your Wallet."
video player is on h2. The initial user preference is lowest_price. We change it to
highest_bandwidth after a few seconds.
Figure 8.4 shows the throughput observed on the server. In the beginning, the
throughput is about 1 Mbps 5. After the user changes the preference, the new video
segments are routed through the 6 Mbps path. The server detects the increased
throughput, thus increases the bitrate of the upcoming video segments. This can be
observed at the 22nd second, when the throughput bursts to about 6 Mpbs. This
experiment illustrates the scenario where the user is not satised with the current
service, thus shift to a more expensive service for better quality. Such paradigm is
critical for promoting the providers' competition.
5Sometimes the burst throughput exceeds the bandwidth limit, because the limit is implemented
by GENI's QoS function instead of a physical limit, so it can be broken through during burst transfer
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8.2 iperf Test
The way ChoiceNet can help network evolution is through long-term economical
interactions. Though it is dicult to show this in a short-term demonstration, we
can set up multiple economical entities and observe their economical interactions.
In this experiment, we set up two customers, both trying to use the highest band-
width path. In a network without economy plane, they may end up with using the
same path and competing with each other. In ChoiceNet, after the provider reserves
the highest bandwidth path for the rst customer, it becomes unavailable to the sec-
ond customer. The second customer will get the second-highest bandwidth path. This
both increases the utilization of the entire network, and avoids possible congestions.
In order to get more accurate throughput data, we use iperf6 to generate the
test TCP trac. h1 is the server, h2 and h3 are clients, and both clients use
highest_bandwidth preference. Figure 8.5 shows the egress throughput observed
on h1. In the beginning, h2 requests for the highest bandwidth path, the 6 Mbps
path is chosen and provisioned (p3 in Figure 8.1). Since p3 reserves all the bandwidth
on link s4-s5 and s4-s6, the second client only have one option: p2. Therefore, when
h3 requests for the highest bandwidth path, it can only get the 3 Mbps path. From
the gure it can be observed that both client can get the full bandwidth they pur-
chased. Since the trac is travelling on two dierent paths, they didn't experience
any competition from each other.
This test scenario demonstrates that the economical interactions incurred by
ChoiceNet helps to fully utilize the available network capability. It encourages the
users to use alternative instead of competing on a single path. Although this is a
short-term example, we believe comprehensive economical interactions will prompt
the evolution of the network services.
6https://iperf.fr/
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Figure 8.5. Interactions of two customers.
8.3 Performance Evaluation
Although the ChoiceNet enables choice, it also introduces additional overhead
when originating a ow. To quantify the additional overhead, we measure the average
time it takes to perform each step of setting up a ow (see Table 8.1).
The results here assume the choice is made instantly. The path query (which
contains the ParetoBFS running time) and provisioning time highly depends on the
round-trip time (RTT) between the marketplace and the providers/users. In this
experiment, the RTT is about 70 ms between the marketplace and the users. Since
the topology is small, ParetoBFS running time is trivial compared to other overhead.
For larger topology with several thousands of nodes, the ParetoBFS running time
may increase to the order of seconds. Once the ow is set up, packets ow through
the data plane without any added overhead.
Compared to the standard SDN, where each switch needs to send the rst packet
to the controller for decision, ChoiceNet installs ow table entry on all the switches
along the path at the same time. This reduces the setup time if there are more than
one switch on the path.
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Table 8.1. Breakdown of connection setup times.
Task Time
path query 72.19 ms
ParetoBFS running time (included above) 0.38 ms
Provision the path 150.11 ms
Total connection setup time 222.30 ms
8.4 Conclusions
This chapter presents the deployment of ChoiceNet implementation on GENI. The
test results show this implementation is capable of performing a complete pathlet
service transaction. The users can choose the paths according to their preference.
This brings various advantages such as exible path migrating and load balancing
driven by bidding.
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CHAPTER 9
SUMMARY
Economic relationships between entities in the network are a critical driver for
operation of the Internet. This work presents the design of ChoiceNet, an economic
plane that can associate economic contracts with network layer services. After pre-
senting the architecture of ChoiceNet, this work rst denes a syntax for network
layer service. Such syntax allows an unied representation of services, making a s-
tandardized service selling and purchasing protocol on the marketplace. Then we
describes the architecture of the marketplace. APIs for customers and providers are
introduced, and parallel computing are used to boost the marketplace performance.
We have also solved various design challenges in the use plane, including the control
logic in a centralized environment, the ChoiceNet App which integrate the economy
interaction into the end system, and the routing algorithm for both intra- and inter-
domain path. Two types of hybrid deployment with legacy network are proposed,
which helps the incremental deployment in the current Internet. We have deployed
the implementation on GENI. Evaluation results show this implementation is capable
of enabling the economical interactions between entities.
This work also addresses some fundamental algorithmic problems in ChoiceNet.
Two new algorithms, ParetoBFS and OrthCredential, are presented. ParetoBFS
solves the problem of nding all the Pareto-optimal paths in a multi-criteria net-
work. Experiments show it works well and can get a solution on a typical network in
reasonable time. OrthCredential is a new credential design to solve the problem of
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protecting reserved services with very low overhead in terms of verication time and
memory consumption, while guaranteeing good security performance.
We believe that integrating the realities of economic relationships into the core
of new network architectures is critical to ensure that innovative technology can be
deployed in the future Internet. The design and implementation described in this
dissertation is an important step into this direction.
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